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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Currently, some microfinance institutions in Bolivia are adopting Corporate 
Social Responsibility (CSR), a concept whereby companies integrate social and 
environmental concerns in their business operations and publish the results.   
CSR is applied mostly by big companies in the North and in sectors more in the 
eye of the public, such as oil production or textile and apparel.  A number of research 
questions arise: Why would small financial institutions from a country in the South and 
under little public scrutiny incorporate CSR in their organizations? Microfinance, their 
business operation, is already considered social, why go beyond that? Could it be the 
case of truly social-committed firms or are they just acting strategically? What role do 
stakeholders play in the microfinance institutions' (MFIs) decision to engage CSR? 
The following paragraphs describe the problem statement, justification and 
research questions of this thesis.    
 
 
1.1 Problem Statement 
In its most basic definition, to commercialize is “to develop commerce in” or “to 
manage on a business basis”.1 In microfinance, the notion of commercialization denotes 
a) the transformation of NGOs dedicated to microfinance into licensed financial entities 
(this investigation focuses on such transformed NGOs); and b) banks and finance 
companies that downscale their operations.2   
Bolivia has been the pioneer in the commercialization of microfinance through 
microfinance NGO transformations.3 Many promoters and managers of Bolivian 
microfinance NGOs readily embraced the notion of commercialization as one that 
reflects their commitment to a market approach to microcredit, implying principles such 
as sustainability, professionalism and efficiency in the provision of financial services to 
the poor.4 
                                                 
1  WEBSTER, Merriam.  Dictionary and Thesaurus on Line.  
2  BAYDAS, M. et. al. (1998), Commercial Banks in Microfinance: New Actors, pp. 4-8. 
3  The model was introduced worldwide in 1992 when Prodem, a microfinance NGO, obtained a bank license 
as BancoSol.  
4  PECK CHRISTENSEN, R. and DRAKE, D. (2003), Commercialization: The New Reality of 
Microfinance, p 3. 
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Since expectations of the role of microcredit in the fight against poverty 
increased after the first results achieved by leading microfinance NGOs in the mid 
1980s, the commercialization process gained much support from different stakeholders.  
For instance, stakeholders such as donors and APEX institutions5 provided financial 
support and technical assistance to microfinance NGOs (according to donors’ 
preferences some received less, others more).  Meanwhile, the Bolivian Government 
and the Superintendence of Banks invested resources to adapt the normative and 
regulative framework to allow microfinance NGOs to undergo the formalization process 
in order to obtain operating licenses as regulated financial entities.6 Microfinance NGOs 
became shareholders in the newly created institutions and some of them attracted 
international NGOs as investors to obtain the minimum capital required.7   
The transformation has proven successful.  Today, almost 15 years since the first 
NGO was transformed, five commercial MFIs in Bolivia8 serve 60% of micro-clients, 
hold more than 70% of the microfinance portfolio and are the most productive financial 
institutions in the country with an average return to equity of 18% (the average of the 
banking system is -1.2%)9.   
Several studies assessed the impact of commercial MFIs on the poor, analyzing 
mainly the proportion and degree of poverty of the micro-entrepreneurs in their 
portfolio.  All of them found that these organisations have a positive social impact.  10 
These studies stress that without the transformation to formal financial 
institutions and the access to more funding sources to expand their portfolio, 
commercial MFIs would not have been able to incorporate as many micro-entrepreneurs 
into the financial system as they did, providing them with access to services that only 
supervised institutions can offer, such as savings or money transfer.  11  
Furthermore, in order to increase their social impact, two of the five Bolivian 
commercial MFIs are currently adopting Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)12.  This 
dissertation investigates the reasons behind this decision.    
                                                 
5  APEX Institutions: Second Tier Banks who promote the development of microfinance through loans and 
technical assistance. Three operate in Bolivia: FONDESIF (public), NAFIBO (mixed) and FUNDAPRO (private 
foundation)  
6  FIEDLER, H. and PASTOR, F. (2002), Bolivian Microfinance in Times of Crises, p. 11. 
7  Idem, p. 22. 
8  For the purpose of this thesis, commercial MFIs are only former NGOs, transformed into licensed financial 
institutions. 
9  Superintendencia de Bancos y Entidades Financieras (2004),  Boletín Financiero, pp. 2-53 
10  PECK CHRISTEN, R. and DRAKE, D. (2003), Commercialization: The New Reality in Microfinance,  p. 
6. 
11  WHITE, Vand CAMPTION, A. (2002), Transformation: Journey from NGO to Regulated MFI, pp. 6-12. 
12  Two participate in a pilot project promoted by a Programme of the Swiss Cooperation (PROFIN) in 
collaboration with the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) . They intend to publish a social balance sheet in February 
2006 for the period 2005. 
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As some experts consider, it could be the case that commercial MFIs in Bolivia 
are a perfect example that CSR is intrinsic to firms: private companies engage in social 
activities because they believe it is the right thing to do, to give back something to the 
society.  Commercial MFIs have NGO origins and they made little modifications to 
their mission and vision statements, which are still very social-driven.13 Perhaps it is in 
their institutional nature to promote social activities further than microfinance. 
However, why did the other three commercial MFIs not undertake CSR? Three 
possible answers arise to indicate that there could be reasons other than their social-
driven nature for some MFIs to undertake CSR. 
First, due to the characteristics of the market, there may well be more benefits in 
CRS than costs.  Bolivia has long been the most concentrated microfinance market in 
the West Hemisphere.14 In a niche where clients are poor people, a cleaner face can 
make a difference and probably the managers and directors of some MFIs see in CSR an 
opportunity to differentiate their corporate image, increase clients or get access to funds 
from social investors.15  
Secondly, probably ‘the eye of the public’ is different for MFIs.  They do not 
face environmental or human rights groups in contrast to firms in the North, but some 
MFIs are possibly under more pressure from social stakeholders than others.   
Currently, commercial MFIs still depend – some more, some less – on 
international NGOs to fund their credit activities.   Moreover, in most cases, the main 
shareholders are still the founder microfinance NGO.16 Now that they are very 
profitable, it would not be surprising for these stakeholders to be interested in more 
social activities additional to microfinance, especially in the MFIs who receive more 
funds.    
Finally, some MFIs could be more prepared to engage in CSR since they are 
already engaged in some unstructured social activities in addition to microfinance.  This 
would give them a competitive advantage over the other MFIs making them more 
inclined to adopt CSR.  As a consequence, taking Bolivian commercial MFIs as case 
study, the main research problem arises: What motivates small firms in the South to 
                                                 
13  WHITE, V. and CAMPTION, A. (2002), Transformation: Journey from NGO to Regulated MFI, p. 4. 
14  PECK CHRISTENSEN, R. and DRAKE, D. (2003), Commercialization: The New Reality of 
Microfinance, p 5. 
15  Some Socially Responsible Investors are already targeting MFIs as promising companies On August 2004, 
Citigroup/Banamex announced the issuance of five year peso-denominated investment grade bonds on behalf of 
Financiera Compartamos, a local microfinance institution in Mexico. See PEREGRINO, M. (2005), Microfinance: A 
Viable Investment Option, p. 2. 
16  FIEDLER, H. and PASTOR, F. (2002), Bolivian Microfinance in Times of Crises, p. 11. 
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engage in CSR? Could it be the case of truly social-committed firms or are they just 
acting strategically?  
Two secondary research questions will also guide the investigation: (1) To 
which degree can stakeholders influence firms to undertake CSR? (2) Are the already 
more socially-committed firms inclined to engage first in CSR?  
The Corporate Social Responsibility framework and stakeholder theories are 
used to investigate and compare three commercial MFIs in Bolivia, two adopting CSR 
and one not.   A short description of these institutions is presented in Annex A. 
1.2 Justification 
From the theoretical perspective 
Since the publishing of Freeman’s milestone book “Strategic Management: A 
Stakeholder Approach” in 1984, hundreds of articles have been written about 
stakeholder theory.17 The theory now constitutes one of the most central frameworks for 
conceptualizing and understanding the CSR “field”.   Donaldson and Preston in 1995 
have organized the diverse range of articles on stakeholder theory in a taxonomy of 
different stakeholder theory types, including the instrumental (strategic) and normative 
approaches.18   
From a normative perspective, where moral or philosophical guidelines 
influence firms to adopt stakeholder management and CSR, Bolivian MFIs seem a 
perfect example due to their NGO origins, social-driven premises and good record of 
social impact through microfinance. 
Nevertheless, Bolivian MFIs also represent profitability, solvency and efficient 
management, being the best performing financial institutions of the country, with a 
market oriented and strategic approach to microfinance.  Therefore, it may be that their 
adoption of stakeholder management and CSR follows the achievement of more 
traditional corporate objectives (market share, profit, corporate image), representing a 
behaviour framed in the instrumental (strategic) perspective of the theory.   
Consequently, these small financial institutions are an interesting case study to 
compare and analyse the main reasons for firms adopting structured programmes aimed 
at performing social activities in addition to their day-to-day business.  Is it because 
they have an intrinsic moral and ethical mission or because it is strategic for their 
                                                 
17  FREEMAN, E. (1984), Strategic Management: A stakeholder approach, pp. 40-55. 
18  DONALDSON, T., and PRESTON, L. E. (1995). The stakeholder theory of the corporation: Concepts, 
evidence, and implications, pp. 65-91 
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corporate performance?  This thesis hopefully could contribute to this discussion current 
in the CSR field. 
From the microfinance perspective 
Ever since the transformation of NGOs into private enterprises, some theorists 
and practitioners are concerned about a mission drift that would be associated with a 
commercial approach to microfinance.  They argue that a commitment to sustainability 
and profitability virtually guarantees that a MFI will move up market, abandoning 
poorer clients.  In fact, critics of commercialization frequently note that the average loan 
size of commercialized microfinance institutions has significantly increased; becoming 
much higher than that of non-profit MFIs that target the poorest clients.  19 
Nonetheless, other studies have shown that this upscale in the average loan size 
is an outcome of more “mature” clients in the portfolio (long term customers with larger 
loans) and the introduction of new products that require higher amounts (for example 
housing).  In fact, these studies conclude that commercial MFIs – due to bigger loan 
portfolios and economies of scale –allocate more microloans (under USD 500) than 
their non-profit competitors.20  
The discussion is still open in the microfinance community, but it only focuses 
on MFIs’ business operations: microfinance.  The present investigation will provide 
donors, theorists and practitioners more information to include in the debate, comparing 
the base line of three MFIs within the CSR framework and incorporating determinants 
beyond portfolio composition or client outreach. 
The outcome of the thesis will also be important to MFIs, offering them 
transparency and disclosure about their current situation with respect to CSR compared 
to their peers, in order to attract potential funding through Socially Responsible 
Investors (SRI).  A recent study shows that SRIs are increasing their share of bonds and 
stocks from microfinance, targeting the best performing commercial MFIs in Latin 
America.21 
From the development perspective 
As it is described in this thesis, Corporate Social Responsibility recently has 
become a powerful concept to attract the attention of policy makers, management and 
ethical scholars and, most importantly, private firms.  Much has been written about CSR 
and important organisations such as the United Nations and the European Union are 
                                                 
19  PECK CHRISTENSEN, R. and DRAKE, D. (2003), Commercialization: The New Reality in 
Microfinance,  p. 6. 
20  Idem, p.8. 
21  PEREGRINO, M. (2005), Microfinance: A Viable Investment Option, p. 2.  
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promoting the concept publicly.  Nevertheless, most of the policies launched by these 
organisations are tailored for firms in the North that wish to reduce impacts of economic 
globalisation on poor countries.22 
Generally, private firms in the South are not considered as part of development 
programmes and projects, and are rarely included in the formulation and 
implementation of social policies.  Similarly, the CSR literature about firms based in 
developing countries is limited and mostly deals with big firms that hold similarities to 
companies in the North, such as oil companies.23  
Understanding what motivates small firms in the South to engage in CSR could 
be an important contribution to the development literature.  Once they know how 
companies in developing countries envisage CSR, and what benefits they expect from 
it, policy makers can design and implement development policies to promote CSR.   
Policies that take into consideration the real reasons behind CSR engagement 
can lead to programmes providing effective incentives to private firms in the South to 
play a central role in efforts to eliminate poverty, achieving equitable and accountable 
systems of governance and ensuring social security. 
 This starting point can bring new themes, debates and agendas to the sustainable 
development arena, offering both opportunities and challenges for firms in the South. 
1.3 Research Objectives  
The objectives of this investigation are (1) to assess and compare the reasons 
why the selected Bolivian commercial MFIs are engaged, or not engaged, in CSR; (2) to 
determine which stakeholders are more relevant for each MFI analysed, assessing how 
they influenced the decision to adopt or not adopt CSR; and (3) to compare the current 
social performance of the selected MFIs within the framework of corporate social 
responsibility.  
                                                 
22  See www.globalpolicy.org for the UN programme on CSR and 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/soc-dial/csr/index.htm for the EU policies. 
23  UNIDO (2002), Corporate Social Responsibility, Implications for Small and Medium Enterprises in 
Developing Countries, pp. 5-62. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW AND  
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 
Over the past decades, CSR was given great visibility among practitioners, 
policy makers and, most importantly, private firms in countries from the North and the 
South.   Therefore, an important new line of inquiry within the CSR field is no longer if 
firms engage in CSR, but rather, what catalyzes organizations to engage in expanding 
CSR initiatives.   
Due to problems of empirically linking social and economic objectives of a 
corporation, it has been difficult for scholars to provide a theoretical background to 
CSR.  Nevertheless, one wing of management analysis, stakeholder theory, has been 
found to be quite applicable to the concept.   According to the theory, what matters is 
the survival of the firm, which is affected not only by stockholders, but also by various 
other stakeholders such as employees, government and customers.  Therefore, the 
theory provides managers with tools for developing more (socially) balanced and 
stronger strategies that reflect changes inside the firm and in the environment 
surrounding it.    
In 1995, a first taxonomy divided stakeholder theory in three mainstreams, 
descriptive, normative and instrumental.   Descriptive stakeholder theory is used to 
describe how stakeholders can influence firms to undertake social strategies.  
Instrumental theory argues that firms undertake stakeholder management to achieve 
traditional corporate objectives.   Finally, normative stakeholder theory suggests that 
firms engage in stakeholder management due to moral or philosophical guidelines.    
The next section discusses more extensively the evolution of the CSR concept 
and Stakeholder Theory.  In the final section some hypotheses are derived from the 
theory. 
 
 
2.1 Corporate Social Responsibility 
The concept of corporate social responsibility (CSR) refers to “the firm’s 
considerations of, and response to, issues beyond the narrow economic, technical, and 
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legal requirements of the firm to accomplish social benefits along with the traditional 
economic gains which the firm seeks”.24 
Most of what has been written on CSR focused on corporate social 
irresponsibility and the reaction of the public to it.25 The best-known example is Royal 
Dutch Shell and the allegations that the corporation supported the Nigerian military in 
its execution of the writer Saro-Wiwa and other Ogoni community members for their 
political activities against Shell. Ogoni political organizations pointed at the 
environmental damage Shell allegedly caused to the Niger Delta in its more than 35 
years of operations in the region.26 The eye – and rage – of the public focused actively 
on this event and caused Shell to change its social approach and relationships with host 
countries.27 
Shell re-evaluated its operational principles to establish clearer human rights 
guidelines, and published its first social balance sheet, including a larger commitment to 
human rights and local community development.28 
Although this and other examples such as Ikea, Home Depot, and Nike, 
represents reactive social change, there are also growing examples of proactive social 
change with corporations engaging in “triple bottom line - 3BL” accounting. 29  
In practical terms, 3BL accounting usually means expanding the traditional 
company reporting framework to take into account not just financial outcomes but also 
environmental and social performance.30 
Since the phrase was coined by John Elkington in 1998, the Leading 
organisations in CSR reporting, such as the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) and 
AccountAbility, have embraced and promoted the 3BL concept to measure 
sustainability as good CSR performance in the corporate world.31 According to a study 
in June 2005, at least 2,600 companies worldwide are publishing stand-alone 
citizenship, sustainability, environmental and social reports.32  
Companies adopting this accounting standard give greater visibility to CSR 
rankings (100 Best Corporate Citizens)33; emerging global standards of expected 
                                                 
24  DAVIS, K. 1973. The Case for and Against Business Assumption of Social Responsibilities, p. 313. 
25  CROPANZANO, R., et al, (2004), Accountability for corporate injustice, pp. 107-133. 
26  BAXTER, C., et al, (1995), Ken Saro Wiwa and 8 Ogono people executed: Blood on shell’s hands, p. 1.  
27  AGUILERA, R., et al, (2004), Putting the S Back in Corporate Social Responsibility: A Multi-Level 
Theory of Social Change in Organizations, p. 4. 
28  LIVESEY, S., and KEARINS, K. (2002), Transparent and caring corporations? A study of sustainability 
reports by The Body Shop and Royal Dutch/Shell, pp. 233-260. 
29 SVENDSEN, A., and LABERGE, M., (2005), Engaging Networks for Whole System Change, p. 4. 
30  ELKINGTON, J (1998), Cannibals with Forks: the Triple Bottom Line of 21st Century Business, p. 4.  
31  NORMAN, W. and MACDONALD, C (2003), Getting to the Bottom of “Triple Bottom Line”, p. 2.  
32  WHITE, A. (2005), New Wine, New Bottles: The Rise of Non-Financial Reporting, p. 2. 
33  See www.business-ethics.com/100best.htm.  
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responsible conduct (e.g. the United Nations’ Global Compact)34; and incorporating 
accountability initiatives (e.g. SA 8000 and AA 1000)35 into production processes and 
global supply chains. Some evidence of proactive social change is that in 2002, 45% of 
the Fortune global top 250 companies produced a separate social and/or environmental 
report, despite not being legally required to do so.36 
This spread of the concept of CSR in business has meant that the social and 
ethical issues facing companies in their strategic planning and daily operations have 
become an increasingly important consideration for managers and directors. In a survey 
published in January 2005, the Economist Intelligence Unit reported that more than 
80% percent of executives and investors surveyed in United Kingdom and continental 
Europe believed that corporate responsibility was a central or important consideration in 
investment decisions, double the percentage (44%) who responded the same way 5 
years ago.37  Another study in the United States found that 82% of companies surveyed 
by the United States Chamber of Commerce and Boston College in 2004 considered 
that corporate citizenship needs to be a priority in their business agenda.38 
At first glance, this convergence in the first world seems to hold great promise 
for development. Nelson and Bregrem in 2004 identified five key emerging CSR issues 
of strategic importance to business that lie at the core of development, such as climate 
change, social and environmental risks along the supply chain, product distribution and 
use, access and affordability of essential products (particularly in healthcare and 
information technology) and increasing transparency with respect to corruption and 
human rights.39  
Moreover, and despite a common assumption that CSR is a luxury which 
emerging markets cannot afford, firms in the South are already engaging in an 
extremely wide range of activities that come under CSR. An International Finance 
Corporation (IFC) study published in 2002 highlights the benefits in CSR adoption by 
240 firms from Africa, Asia, Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe.40  
                                                 
34  See www.unglobalcompact.org/Portal/.  
35  SA8000 is a standard and verification system for assuring humane workplaces and is based on international 
workplace norms in the International Labour Organisation (ILO) conventions and the UN’s Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and the Convention on Rights of the Child (see www.sa-intl.org/).   AccountAbility standards, the 
AA1000 Series, are principles based standards intended to provide the basis for improving the sustainability 
performance of organisations (see www.accountability.org.uk/).  
36  KPMG. (2002), KPMG International Survey of Corporate Sustainability Reporting, pp. 1-32. 
37  ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT (2004):, The Importance of Corporate Responsibility, pp. 2-45. 
38  ROCHLIN, S., et al, (2004), The State of Corporate Citizenship in the U.S.: A View from Inside, 2003-
2004, p 4. 
39  NELSON, J., and C. BERGREM (2004), Values and Value: Communicating the Strategic Importance of 
Corporate Citizenship to Investors, pp- 1-34. 
40 IFC, SustainAbility, ETHOS (2004), Developing Value: The business case for sustainability in emerging 
markets, pp. 4 -64. 
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Therefore, an important new line of inquiry within the CSR field is no longer if 
firms engage in CSR, but rather, what catalyzes organizations to engage in an 
increasing number of costly41 CSR initiatives. 
One premise in this investigation is that in either case (reactive or proactive CSR 
initiatives, though the thesis focuses on a proactive case), firms are pressured by internal 
and external actors to engage in CSR actions due to a rapidly changing and competitive 
environment. 
In the following sections, the development of the concept of CSR is introduced 
as an explanatory context while the stakeholder theory is presented as theoretical 
background for CSR and the reasons behind CSR engagement. 
2.2 Development of the CSR Concept  
2.2.1 Social Responsibilities of firms: The 50s and 60s 
Most academics agree that the first effort to theorize the relationship between 
firms and society was that of Howard Bowen in his publication “Social Responsibilities 
of the Businessmen” in 1953.42 
Bowen asserted that corporations must consider social consequences and 
responsibilities due to their position of great influence and the potential consequences of 
their decisions.43  
Bowen’s publication coincided with a legal environment in the United States 
that was becoming more favourable to CSR, so it provided the intellectual background 
to reflect the rapidly changing social environment during the following decade.44 
During the 60s, numerous laws were enacted to regulate businesses and to protect 
employees and consumers, while the growing consumer rights movement directly 
confronted the corporate power, leading to the publication of hundreds of books and 
articles on the subject.45 
Nevertheless, the growing attention to CSR drew serious criticism. The most 
eminent objection to CSR was the classical economic argument proposed by Milton 
Friedman. He argued that the social responsibility of business is only to maximize 
profits for the shareholders within the rules of the game (obey the law, pay taxes, etc), 
                                                 
41  The Economist Intelligent Unit estimates that a full-fledged CSR program can cost up to 2% of total 
revenue. EIU (2004), The Importance of Corporate Responsibility, White paper, p. 3. 
42  CARROLL, A.B. (1979), A Three-Dimensional Conceptual Model of Corporate Performance,  pp. 497-
505. PRESTON, L. E. (1975), Corporation and Society: The Search for a Paradigm., pp 434-453. 
43  B0WEN, H. (1953), Social Responsibilities of the Businessman, p. 3. 
44  PAUL LEE, M. D. and KIM, S. (2005), From Cost to Resource: The Transformation and Diffusion of 
Corporate Social Responsibility, p. 11. 
45  ELKINS, A. (1977), Toward a Positive Theory of Corporate Social Involvement, pp. 128-133. 
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and considered CSR a subversive doctrine that threaten the foundation of a free 
enterprise society.46 Friedman argued that by pursuing self-interest as Adam Smith’s 
“invisible hand” states, pursuing maximal value for the stockholders will result in 
maximization of social welfare.47 The two decades after Bowen’s publication were 
characterized by fierce debates over the legitimacy of CSR but, despite the active 
discussion, little theoretical improvement was accomplished beyond what Bowen had 
already laid down.48 
2.2.2 Enlightened Self-Interest: The 70s 
In 1970, the study “A New Rationale for Corporate Social Policy” 
commissioned by the Committee for Economic Development restructured the CSR 
debate by providing reconciliation between social and economic interests of firms.49 
The authors realised that without proving that CSR is coherent with stockholder’s 
interests, CSR will always remain questioned. Consequently, they tried to provide a 
“new rationale” that supports CSR without compromising stockholder’s interest.50 
The study shares Friedman’s argument that corporations, within the framework 
of utility maximization for stockholders, should not engage in CSR, but it also argues 
that the modern stock portfolio became so diversified that the meaning of shareholder’s 
interest has considerably changed.51 
By 1970, to spread risk, most stockholders already owned shares in many 
companies. Therefore, they were not interested in maximization of profit in just one 
company at the possible expense of other companies in which they owned shares. In 
other words, owners of diversified portfolios would want to achieve social optimization 
through joint profit maximization, and would want to spread “social expenditures 
evenly over all firms to the point where marginal cost equals marginal appropriable 
benefits”, being consistent with the long-term interest for corporations to be socially 
minded.52 
This approach was called the “enlightened self-interest model” and produced a 
new breed of research in the field of CSR in the 70s.53 The enlightened self-interest 
                                                 
46  FRIEDMAN, M. (1962), Capitalism and Freedom, p. 2. 
47  FRIEDMAN, M. (1970), The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, p. 13. 
48  WARTICK, S. L., and COCHRAN, P. L. (1985), The Evolution of the Corporate Social Performance 
Model, pp:.758-769. 
49  WALLICH, H. C., and MCGOWAN, J. J. (1970), Stockholder Interest and the Corporation's Role in 
Social Policy, pp. 154-166.  
50  ELKINS, A. (1977), Toward a Positive Theory of Corporate Social Involvement, pp. 128-133. 
51  WALLICH, H. C., and MCGOWAN, J. J. (1970), Stockholder Interest and the Corporation's Role in 
Social Policy, pp. 154-166.  
52  Ibid. 
53  ELKINS, A. (1977), Toward a Positive Theory of Corporate Social Involvement, pp. 128-133. 
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model, however, was developed more as a concept than as a full-scale theoretical 
model, loosely coupling social and economic interests.54 
Even as late as 1975, Preston argued that the field of CSR still lacked an 
accepted theoretical paradigm, and called for more progress in conceptualization, 
empirical evidence and policy development.55 
2.2.3 Corporate Social Performance Model: The 80s 
In 1979, Carroll proposed a three-dimensional conceptual model of corporate 
social performance (CSP) and this immediately gained recognition as a more complete 
theoretical approach towards CSR.56  
Carroll’s model combines corporate social responsibility, social issues, and 
corporate social responsiveness under the umbrella of CSP, identifying the modes in 
which firms can achieve significant performance improvement once they have adopted 
social responsibility as a relevant concept.57 
The 3-D model attempted to provide theorists with an understanding of the 
differences between definitions of CSR, and managers with a tool to better comprehend 
how to integrate CSR into the economic framework of a company by considering 
CSP.58 
The most important contribution of the model is that the three-dimensional 
model does not treat economic and social goals of a corporation to be incompatible 
tradeoffs. Rather, both corporate objectives are integrated into the framework of the 
total social responsibility of business. As a social institution, corporations need to care 
for issues such as community, environment and employees as well as make good 
profits.59 
Wood extended the model in 1991, linking CSP with numerous related theories 
in organizational studies such as organizational institutionalism and management 
theories, in order to create a more useful and managerially model.60 
Nevertheless, during the 80s, researchers and managers -due mainly to its 
inability to test empirically the relationship between CSR and CSP- never applied the 3-
D model widely.61 Without clear and more consistent mechanisms to measure corporate 
                                                 
54  WEIK, K. (1977), Educational Organizations as Loosely Coupled Systems, pp.1-19. 
55  PRESTON, L. E. (1975), Corporation and Society: The Search for a Paradigm., pp 434-453. 
56  WOOD, D. J. (1991). Corporate Social Performance Revisited, pp. 691-718. 
57  CARROLL, A. B. (1979), A Three-Dimensional Conceptual Model of Corporate Performance, p. 12. 
58  Idem, p. 3. 
59  Idem, pp.6-13 
60  WOOD, D. J. (1991). Corporate Social Performance Revisited, pp. 691-718. 
61  MARGOLIS, J. and WALSH, J. (2001), Misery loves companies - Whither social initiatives by business? 
pp. 1-33 
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performance, the risk associated in engaging CSR could not be significantly reduced for 
the shareholders.62  
2.2.4 Management Theory: The 90s 
The question of why some companies constantly perform better than others has 
produced many studies on management theory.63 One wing of management analysis, 
stakeholder theory, has been found to be quite applicable to CSR.64 
The stakeholder model solved the problem of measurement and empirical testing 
by narrowing the actors and simplifying their relationship with the firm.65 From 
managers’ perspective, their responsibilities to employees, customers and government 
are much easier to visualise and manage than their responsibilities to society. Moreover, 
most firms, whether deliberately or unintentionally, have already been managing the 
relationships with the main actors in their immediate surrounding environment 
(employees, customers and government) and keeping records of their transactions or 
interactions.66 
The concept of stakeholders first surfaced in management literature in the 60s. 
By the 70s, variants of stakeholder theory were already being tested by major 
corporations in the United States.67 The stakeholder perspective, though, remained 
mostly secondary to management theory until mid 80s when Edward Freeman 
introduced the first systematic theory of stakeholders.68  
The theory was developed further during the 90s when – due to globalization 
and more transparent and available information about firms’ impact on society –  
management theorists started to acknowledge that firms have strong connections with 
other relevant and influential stakeholders than stockholders.69 
A unique feature of stakeholder theory is that it envisions a corporation’s 
purpose in an entirely different way. With stakeholder theory, the difference between 
social and economic objectives of a corporation is no longer pertinent, because the core 
matter is the survival of the firm.70 Survival of a corporation is affected not only by 
                                                 
62  PAUL LEE, M. D. and KIM, S. (2005), From Cost to Resource: The Transformation and Diffusion of 
Corporate Social Responsibility, p. 14. 
63  DRUKER, P. F. (1993), Post-capitalist society, p. 12. 
64  CLARKSON, M. E. (1995), A stakeholder framework for analyzing and evaluating corporate social 
performance, pp. 92-117. 
65  PAUL LEE, M. D. and KIM, S. (2005), From Cost to Resource: The Transformation and Diffusion of 
Corporate Social Responsibility, p. 16. 
66   Idem, p. 17. 
67  Ibid. 
68  FREEMAN, E. (1984), Strategic Management: A stakeholder approach, pp. 40-55 
69  Ibid. 
70  MULLINS, L. (2001). Management and organizational behavior, pp. 3-42. 
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stockholders, but also by various other stakeholders such as employees, government and 
customers.  
Because of its broad scope and emphasis on relationships, the stakeholder theory 
had some obvious implications for CSR and much literature has since developed on the 
subject.71 The next section discusses the theory, proposing three different approaches to  
the question why firms engage in CSR. 
2.3 Theory behind CSR: Stakeholder Theory 
2.3.1 Definition of Stakeholder Theory 
According to Freeman's now-classic definition: “A stakeholder in an 
organization is any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement 
of the organization's objectives”.72  
The focus of the theory has been the manager of the organisation, and how 
he/she recognises and works with the various stakeholders and their claims. Freeman 
specified that the theory he had presented was an "inherently 'managerial'" concept or a 
framework about managerial and, organizational behaviour.73  
The origins of the theory are to be found in a desire to provide managers with 
tools for developing more balanced and stronger strategies that reflect changes inside 
the firm and in the environment surrounding it.74  
While internal stakeholders such as employees, customers, and stockholders 
have long been emphasized in management and strategy research, stakeholder theory 
brings attention also to outside constituencies such as community activists, advocacy 
groups, religious organizations and other non-governmental organizations. Such 
stakeholders are often referred to as “secondary” since, in general, they do not have a 
formal contractual bond with the firm (as is the case with employees and customers) or 
direct legal authority over the firm (as is the case with government regulators).75 While 
firms are not contractually obligated to these secondary stakeholders, evidence suggests 
that these groups, if they have the means and the legitimacy, can bring pressures to 
induce firms to respond to stakeholder requests.76 
                                                 
71  JONES, T.M. (1995), Instrumental stakeholder theory: A synthesis of ethics and economics, pp. 404-437. 
72  Idem, p. 46. 
73  Idem, p. 43. 
74  CLARKSON M.B. (1995), A stakeholder framework for analyzing and evaluating corporate social 
performance, pp. 92-117. 
75  Ibid. 
76  MITCHEL, R.K., AGLE, B.R., and WOOD, D.J. (1997). Toward a theory of stakeholder identification and 
salience: Defining the principle of who and what really counts, pp. 853–886. 
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Freeman, as a main proponent of the stakeholder view on corporate 
management, argues that the success of a firm should be measured by the satisfaction 
between all stakeholders. Therefore, advocates of the stakeholder perspective state that 
social responsibility is an organizational concern and assert that society is best attended 
by pursuing joint-interests and economic symbiosis.77   
2.3.2 Taxonomy of Stakeholder Theory 
Since Freeman introduced stakeholder theory into the management arena in 
1984, a diverse and ample stakeholder literature has developed. The idea that 
corporations have stakeholders has now become commonplace in management 
literature. 78  
In 1995, Donaldson and Preston presented a first taxonomy of stakeholder 
theory to organize the wide range of articles on stakeholder theory. The taxonomy 
divided stakeholder theory in three mainstreams, descriptive, normative and 
instrumental.79  
Descriptive stakeholder theory is used to “describe, and sometimes explain” the 
operations of companies.80 Instrumental theory is “used to identify the connections, or 
lack of connections, between stakeholder management and the achievement of 
traditional corporate objectives”.81 Finally, it is argued that normative stakeholder 
theory is used to “interpret the function of the corporation” and to identify “moral or 
philosophical guidelines” for corporate operations.82  
2.3.2.1 The Normative Approach to Stakeholder Management 
Stakeholder theory has mainly been covered from a normative perspective, 
affirming that managerial relationships with stakeholders are founded on moral and 
ethical obligations rather than on a wish to use those stakeholders exclusively to 
maximize revenues.83  
Within this framework, the normative theory argues that decisions of firms 
affect stakeholder outcomes and ethics should be involved in these decisions. Ethics, in 
the Kantian view, deals with obligations that arise when a decision of an individual or 
                                                 
77  DE WIT, B., and MEYER, R. (1999). Strategy synthesis. Resolving strategy paradoxes to create 
competitive advantage, pp. 52-80. 
78   According to the University of Toronto, more than 250 articles and books have been written about 
stakeholder theory since Freeman (see http://www.mgmt.utoronto.ca/~stake/Articles.htm) 
79  DONALDSON, T., and PRESTON, L. E. (1995). The stakeholder theory of the corporation: Concepts, 
evidence, and implications, pp. 65-91 
80  Idem, p. 70. 
81  Idem, p. 71. 
82  Ibid. 
83  BERMAN, S., A. WICKS, et al. (1999). Does Stakeholder Orientation Matter? The Relationship Between 
Stakeholder Management Models and Firm Financial Performance, pp. 488- 506. 
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firm has an effect on others; regardless of precisely what constitutes an ethical decision, 
decisions made without any consideration of their impact on others are usually thought 
to be unethical.84  
Moreover, normative advocates state that this moral decision making should be 
made regardless of the benefits derived from it. Donaldson and Preston point out that 
certain claims of stakeholders are based on fundamental moral principles unrelated to 
the benefits that stakeholders can offer to a corporation”,.85 In this context, these 
claims are independent of the strategic concerns of firms and stakeholder welfare is 
considered to form the foundation of the firm’s strategy itself.86  
In this vein, a Kantian posture87, a feminist perspective88, and a fair contracts 
approach89 are examples of moral principles that can form the normative foundation for 
stakeholder-oriented management. 
Moreover, the normative orientation argues that building a profitable and 
strategic commitment to morality is not only conceptually flawed but is also ineffective. 
From a practical perspective, Jones argues that benefits of stakeholder management 
ironically result only from a genuine dedication to ethical values.90 He states that 
organizations that produce and maintain stakeholder relationships based on reciprocal 
trust will have a competitive advantage over those that do not.91  
If the commitment of an organization to trust and cooperation is strategic rather 
than intrinsic, it will not be easy for the organization to sustain the sincere behaviour 
and reputation required for its attractiveness as a financial partner (i.e., trustworthiness, 
honesty, and integrity are difficult to fake).92 Thus, in order to harvest the profits of 
stakeholder strategic management, a firm must be committed to ethical relationships 
with stakeholders despite expected remuneration. Moral principles, if strategically 
applied are not really moral and, paradoxically, can not lead to the strategic results 
planned.93  
To this extent, the model is called the intrinsic or normative stakeholder 
commitment model because the interests of stakeholders have intrinsic value; they enter 
                                                 
84  Bowie, N (1994), A Kantian Approach to Business Ethics, pp. 3-8. 
85  DONALDSON, T., and PRESTON, L. E. (1995). The stakeholder theory of the corporation: Concepts, 
evidence, and implications, pp. 65-70. 
86  Idem p. 71. 
87  Bowie, N (1994), A Kantian Approach to Business Ethics, pp. 2-16. 
88  WICKS, A.C., GILBERT, D.R., Jr., and FREEMAN, R.E. (1994).,A Feminist Reinterpretation of the 
Stakeholder Concept, pp. 475-497. 
89  PHILLIPS, R. A. (1997), Stakeholder Theory and a Principle of Fairness, pp. 51-66. 
90  Jones, T.M. (1995)., Instrumental stakeholder theory: A synthesis of ethics and economics,  p. 437. 
91  Idem, p. 434. 
92  FRANK R. (1988), Passions with Reason, p. 4  
93  Idem, p. 6. 
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the decision-making of firms prior to strategic considerations, and form a moral base for 
corporate strategy itself.94 
However, the normative stakeholder theory has inherent difficulties in 
translating this concept into a practical and widely accepted model for managing 
stakeholder relations. Rowan refers to the fact that the emergent ethical theory is often 
relayed to business managers in a complex and impractical form. Furthermore, the study 
of ethics, unlike the study of science, often suffers from a perceived inability to provide 
valid conclusions.95 
Furthermore, managers who accept normative stakeholder theory are faced by 
the fundamental problem of partiality. With the imperative assumption that all 
legitimate stakeholder claims are worthy of equal consideration by the business 
organization, managers are immediately faced by difficult questions over stakeholder 
prioritization.96  
2.3.2.2 The Descriptive Approach to Stakeholder Management 
The descriptive/empirical theory focuses mainly on characterizing the actual 
actions of firms and stakeholder groups as they interact. The theory describes the nature 
of a firm, the way managers think about managing and how board members think about 
the interests of stakeholders (i.e., how corporations are managed in practice).  In this 
sense, the descriptive view is empirical, reflecting and explaining past events, present 
and future states of an organization’s affairs and their stakeholders.97 
Studies within this theory have examined, for example, the beginning stages of 
stakeholder mobilization; such as when stakeholder groups act, what tactics they choose 
and how firms react to these actions.98  
Other works, such as Mitchell et al.’s framework, provide guidance to the 
conditions under which firms are likely to positively respond to the requests of 
secondary stakeholders. According to this framework, three attributes of stakeholders 
determine their salience to managers (salience being defined as the degree to which 
managers give priority to competing stakeholder claims). The three attributes are 
stakeholder power, legitimacy, and urgency. The greater the power, legitimacy, and 
urgency of the stakeholder group, the greater the stakeholder group’s saliency will be in 
                                                 
94  JONES, T, BERMAN, S.L.,. WICKS, A.C and KOTHA, S., Does Stakeholder Orientation Matter? The 
Relationship between Stakeholder Management Models and Firm Financial Performance, p. 490. 
95  ROWAN, J.  (2000), The Moral Foundation of Employee Rights, pp. 355-361. 
96  GIBSON, K. ‘The Moral Basis of Stakeholder Theory’, pp. 245-257. 
97  Idem, p. 70- 81. 
98  CARMIN, J., and BALSER, D.B. (2002), Selecting repertoires of action in environmental movement 
organizations, pp. 365-388. 
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the eyes of managers.99  In the sections that follow, each of the three elements of 
Mitchell et al.’s are discussed. 
Power 
Arguably, the greater the power of the stakeholder group, the greater will be the 
saliency of a request (i.e. likelihood that a firm responds to a stakeholder request). 
Power is defined by Mitchell et al. as “a relationship among social actors in which one 
social actor, A, can get another social actor, B, to do something that B would not have 
otherwise done”.100   
This definition is vague, since it does not offer a measurement for power. 
Therefore, this thesis will adopt a complementary definition of power based on resource 
dependency theory. 
Resource dependency theory emphasizes that firms act to gain access to the 
resources necessary for operation and survival. As a result, the relative power between 
organizations is conditioned by links to needed resources.101 
In this sense, a firm will respond positively to a stakeholder request if the 
organization feels that by not doing so it can hamper the availability of actual or future 
funds or services.  
Legitimacy 
Mitchell et al. propose that more legitimate stakeholders are more likely to 
obtain positive responses from firms. They define legitimacy as “a generalized 
perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper or 
appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and 
definitions” 102  
Greater legitimacy allows the stakeholder a more credible threat to influence the 
firm’s access to critical primary stakeholders such as customers and labour supply.  
Even if a stakeholder group lacks power, as defined by the resource dependence theory 
above, the legitimacy of the group may be sufficient to obtain a positive firm 
response.103 
                                                 
99  MITCHELL, R.K., AGLE, B.R., and WOOD, D.J. (1997). Toward a theory of stakeholder identification 
and salience: Defining the principle of who and what really counts. P. 853–886. 
100  Idem, p 860. 
101  PFEFFER, J. and G. R. SALANCIK (1978), The external control of organizations, p 9. 
102  MITCHELL, R.K., AGLE, B.R., and WOOD, D.J. (1997). Toward a theory of stakeholder identification 
and salience: Defining the principle of who and what really counts, p. 862. 
103  Idem, pp. 860-863. 
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One problem with Mitchell et al.’s definition of legitimacy is that it is conceived 
only as a characteristic of the stakeholder.104 Sometimes the stakeholder’s claim is the 
important issue, not only the stakeholder itself. Therefore, this thesis – based on the 
work of Eesley and Lenox – proposes that legitimacy is given not only to the 
stakeholder group, but also to the specific claims championed by the stakeholder.105 
Urgency 
The final component of Mitchell et al.’s framework is urgency. Urgency is 
defined as “the degree to which stakeholder claims call for immediate attention.” 106 
Urgency includes both time sensitivity (the degree to which managerial delay is 
unacceptable to the stakeholder) and, criticality (the importance of the claim to the 
stakeholder). The authors propose that the urgency of a stakeholder group will 
positively influence outcomes.107  
The problem with this definition is that the firm probably will not respond 
positively just because a stakeholder group cares deeply about an issue and wants 
immediate action;  more relevant – ultimately – is the power of the stakeholder group.  
Due to this problem, the present thesis will focus only on power and legitimacy 
as the main attributes of stakeholders. 
2.3.2.3 The Instrumental (Strategic) Approach to Stakeholder Management 
The Instrumental (Strategic) Approach to Stakeholder Theory holds that to 
maximize shareholder value over an uncertain time period, firms ought to pay attention 
to key stakeholder relationships.108  
Instrumental stakeholder theory differs from descriptive stakeholder theory in an 
important aspect. While descriptive stakeholder theory deals with how managers do act, 
instrumental theory deals with the financial effects if managers act towards stakeholders 
in certain ways. For example, it argues that if a firm has a contract with its stakeholders 
based on mutual trust, it will have a competitive advantage over firms that do not.109 
The principal focus of interest in existing instrumental stakeholder theory has 
been the notion that corporations practicing stakeholder management will, other things 
                                                 
104  Idem, p. 861. 
105  EESLEY, Ch. and LENOX, M. (2005), Firm Responses to Secondary Stakeholder Action, p 10. 
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being equal, be relatively successful in conventional performance terms.110  For 
instance, if a mining company extracting in a developing country includes stakeholders 
such as workers, the community and environmental groups into its strategic 
management, the firm will be better prepared to deal with them or to prevent worker’s 
strikes, roads blocked by the community and pressure from environmentalists, reducing 
costs and improving production. 
Therefore, if prudent management of the firm’s operating environment, 
including relationships with its stakeholders, is a part of good management in general, 
good stakeholder management has a clear practical (instrumental) value for the firm.111 
A fundamental assumption of this type of model, in contrast to the normative 
approach, is that the ultimate objective of corporate decisions is marketplace success. A 
firm considers their stakeholders as part of an environment that ought to be managed in 
order to assure revenues, and ultimately, profits to shareholders. 112  
In this view, stakeholder management serves as a means to an end, referring to 
the organization’s interest in stakeholder relationships as instrumental (strategic) and 
contingent on the value of those relationships related directly to financial profits.113 The 
instrumental approach clearly converges to the shareholder view on management since 
instrumental (strategic) ethics enters the context only as an addendum to the rule of 
profit maximization for the firm.114  
To Donaldson and Preston instrumental stakeholder theory is “a framework for 
examining the connections between the practice of stakeholder management and the 
achievement of various financial performance goals”.115 Therefore, concerns of 
stakeholders enter the decision-making process of firms only if they have strategic 
(instrumental) value to the organization, supporting the assumption that firms will 
engage in CSR for reasons beyond moral, normative and ethical values. 
For instance, in markets characterized by increasing competition, firms can start 
strategic stakeholder management in order to create competitive advantages and 
differentiate themselves from their competitors.116  
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According to the instrumental view, firms in competitive markets will engage in 
social and stakeholder strategy only if, in addition to achieving social objectives, it 
creates competitive advantage by developing unique capabilities that have a positive 
impact on the firm’s profitability.117 Research indicates that capabilities and resources 
create competitive advantage when they are valuable, rare, and imperfectly imitable.118 
The instrumental theory indicates that if these capabilities could be accomplish by 
incorporating stakeholder management into the strategic planning, firms will engage in 
social strategy schemes.119  
In this vein, a number of initiatives in the literature have been developed to 
address the links between CSR activity and competitive advantage.  
Murray and Montanari developed a marketing approach to social management 
by considering the social impacts of the company as social goods and services that can 
be managed similarly to how traditional marketing manages ordinary products. In this 
model, the firm identifies markets for social product and determines the marketing 
variables (product, place, price, and promotion) for each relevant stakeholder group. It 
afterwards designs and implements a social responsibility programme to satisfy needs in 
those markets identified, and finally evaluates the capability of the company to satisfy 
societal expectations.120 
Other authors developed a model of social strategy based on Porter’s model of 
competitiveness. For instance, Mahon and McGowan regard the social issue itself as the 
product of the social strategy.121  For these authors, transactions take place in social 
issues rather than in a product market as in Porter’s model, changing the unit of 
exchange from money to influence.122 Analogous to Porter’s five forces model, Mahon 
and McGowan assume five forces that affect social strategy.123 A successful social 
strategy requires an accurate positioning with respect to these forces, though the authors 
do not detail how this positioning can be achieved and how competitive advantages can 
be created.124 
Other researchers analyse the industry structure and argue that prior to 
embarking on a social and stakeholder strategy, different industry characteristics are 
                                                 
117  Idem, p. 3. 
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120  MURRAY, K. and MONTANARY, J.  (1986), Strategic management of the socially responsible firm: 
Integrating management and marketing theory, pp. 815-827. 
121  MAHON, J. and McGOWAN, R (1998), Modelling industry political dynamics, pp. 390-413. 
122  Ibid. 
123  Ibid.   
124  Ibid. 
 
 
 
 
 22
evaluated by managers (external analysis): market concentration, product attribute 
differentiation, and industry growth rates.125 Therefore, in industries where market 
concentration is high and/or product differentiation is difficult to achieve due to small 
margins and/or the industry grows slowly, firms will consider stakeholder management 
to gain a competitive advantage.126  
In competitive markets, companies look for different kinds of strategies to 
achieve superiority in one or more of five traditional competitive factors: product 
image, design, price, service, or corporate reputation.127 Firms will engage in social 
strategy only if it can help to improve these competitive factors. 
Regarding market concentration, strategic stakeholder management could be 
important for less well-positioned firms. Considering again Porter’s strategic analysis, 
small firms, which do not possess the competitive advantage of leadership, would seek 
strategies to gain competitive advantage through differentiation in order to compete 
with market leaders.128 In this view, less well-positioned firms would analyse if 
engaging in stakeholder and social strategies will help them to differentiate themselves 
from market leaders, adding social characteristics to their products and image.129 
Moreover, firms will also evaluate their own internal competitive advantages, 
comparing them to their competitors in the industry (internal analysis).130 Top 
management perceptions of the firm’s competitive advantage over competitors need to 
be assessed with regard to cost advantage, among other factors.131 This dimension of 
internal competitive advantage is an indicator of the perceived power a firm holds in 
relationship to its principal competitors.132 
Consequently, before engaging in social and stakeholder strategy, firms evaluate 
their resources or specific assets useful for creating cost advantages that few 
competitors can acquire easily.  Porter argues that, among other factors, a higher 
“proprietary learning curve” could be a powerful advantage.133 In other words, a firm 
already engaging in social activities would own a useful resource to acquire cost 
advantage over potential competitors, since a higher stage on the proprietary learning 
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curve provides the company with a better understanding of the costs associated with the 
activities in order to perform better.134     
To sum up, instrumental stakeholder theory affirms that firms analyse rationally 
the industry and the market before engaging in social strategies and only embrace CSR 
if they can perceive an authentic differentiation and competitive advantage.  
Recently, CSR literature and particularly instrumental stakeholder theory has  
focused more on testing and discussing the empirical link between CSR and competitive 
factors to prove the “business case” behind stakeholder and social strategy.  Most of this 
literature analyses factors such as financial performance, improvement of reputation, 
attracting better employees and better access to funds.  
Financial Performance 
The focus of instrumental stakeholder theory has great similarities to the general 
empirical quest of showing a connection between corporate social performance (CSP) 
and corporate financial performance (CFP).135 CSP identifies the modes in which firms 
can achieve significant performance improvement once they have adopted social 
responsibility as a relevant concept.136 Some authors argue that true CSR – strategic 
CSR – can only be carried out if a company also profits from its ‘good works’. 137 
Since the early 1980s a significant body of CSR research has centred on the 
debate over whether there is a relationship between good CSP and strong financial 
performance, and what kind of relationship there is. Two of the most recent and 
complete research studies were conducted by Margollis et. al., and Orlitzsky et. al..    
In 2001, in a survey of the past 30 years’ research on the topic, Margollis et. al 
found a weakly positive link between a firm’s overall CSP and CFP in the majority of 
the 95 studies reviewed, but also encountered major methodological and theoretical 
inconsistencies, such as that 70 out of the 95 studies measured CSP differently. This 
determined that any positive link was scientifically inconclusive.138  
On the other hand, in 2003 Orlitzky, et. al.  conducted a meta-analytic study 
analysing 52 studies published between 1972 and 1997, containing a total of 33,878 
observations, finding evidence of a significant positive effect of corporate 
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social/environmental performance on corporate financial performance.139  First, it finds 
that corporate social performance correlates more strongly with corporate financial 
performance when using accounting measures for analysis rather than market-based 
measures, such as stock price. Second, it finds a "virtuous cycle" between corporate 
social and financial performance: not only does strong CSP lead to strong CFP, but also 
strong CFP allows companies to afford spending on social responsibility measures, 
which can lead to increasing CSP – and so on.140 
Some authors argue that this study provided a “breakthrough” in the CSR 
literature and brings some closure on the long running debate about whether it is in 
organizations’ best interest, at least financially, to engage in CSR.141  
According to this approach, the “business case” or the search for better financial 
performance is probably one of the main reasons why companies engage in CSR. 
Image and reputation improvement 
According to a survey of the World Economic Forum 2004, most of the world’s 
leading CEOs and organization leaders consider corporate reputation as a more 
important measure of success than stock market performance, profitability and return on 
investment. 142 
Moreover, some authors argue that CSR and its effects on reputation can have 
significant value as a form of competitive advantage, and that the studies searching for 
the link between CSR and CFP should integrate these effects in order to assess the true 
value of CSR.143 
In CSR literature, the notion of reputation is linked to “a general organizational 
attribute that reflects the extent to which external stakeholders see the firm as ‘good’ 
and not ‘bad’”.144 
As markets have grown to be more competitive, CSR has become an important 
source of differentiation for firms through improvement of image.  Dawkins and Lewis 
found that more than 50% of clients, interviewed from different industries, ranked 
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forms of corporate responsibility – such as community commitment – as the most 
important factor in forming an impression of a company.145  
Scholars argue that in order to translate into positive financial results, the value 
of reputation should be tied intrinsically to the inability for competitors to imitate the 
reputation.146 The value of a positive reputation is “precisely because the development 
of a good reputation takes considerable time, and depends on a firm making stable and 
consistent investments over time”.147  Therefore, reputation is perhaps the most valuable 
asset of any firm and investing in CSR could be very important to the firm. However, 
authors argue that CSR should be introduced and improved rationally and strategically 
in order to obtain important results.148 
In this vein, research has shown that firms that are already considered 
unscrupulous are not able to enhance dramatically their image through CSR, and in fact 
they could harm their reputation by engaging in social activities.149 
The benefits of a good reputation were regarded not only as a positive image but 
also as a form of insurance policy against negative events. Specifically, Klein and 
Dawar found empirical evidence that consumer perceptions of a firm engaging in CSR 
reduced their attributions of blame for a product failure, and argued that CSR may have 
value to the firm even if it does not immediately increase profitability because it can 
help mitigate the effects of a damaging event.150  Their study extended the work of 
previous researchers demonstrating that consumers are more willing to punish the bad 
behaviour of firms than they are willing to reward their good behaviour.151 
Gathering both effects, Fombrun, et. al., affirm that CSR has two forms of 
potential benefits for the firm through reputation enhancement: a positive incremental 
gain as a reward for positive behaviour and a mitigation of consequences from negative 
firm behaviours.152 They categorise these benefits as “opportunities” and “safety 
nets”.153 
                                                 
145  DAWKINS, J. and LEWIS, S. (2003), CSR in Stakeholder Expectations: And Their Implication on 
Corporate Strategy, pp. 185-193. 
146  ROBERTS, P. and DOWNLING, G (2002), Corporate Reputation and Sustained Superior Financial 
Performance, Strategic Management Journal, 23, p. 1089. 
147  Ibid, p. 1085. 
148    PELOZA, John (2004),  Corporate Social Responsibility as Reputation Insurance, p. 14. 
149  DEAN, D. (2003), Consumer Perception of Corporate Donations: Effects of Company Reputation for 
Social Responsibility and Type of Donation, pp. 91-102. 
150  KLEIN, J. and DAWAR, H. (2004), Corporate Social Responsibility and Consumers’ Attributions and 
Brand Evaluations in a Product-Harm Crisis, pp. 203-217. 
151  CREYER, E. and ROSS, W. (1996), The Impact of Corporate Behavior on Perceived Product Value, pp. 
173-185. 
152  FOMBRUN, Ch., et. al. (2000) Opportunity Platforms and Safety Nets: Corporate Citizenship and 
Reputational Risk, pp. 85-106. 
153  Ibid. 
 
 
 
 
 26
Better Access to Funds 
Mark Mansley defined Socially Responsible Investments (SRIs) as “investment 
where social, environmental or ethical considerations are taken into account in the 
selection, retention and realisation of investments, and the responsible use of rights… 
attaching to investment”.154 
The author also provides two main strands to the implementation of Socially 
Responsible Investment. One strand deals with the selection of assets for the portfolio, 
while the other relates to the use of the powers or rights obtained through the investment 
process to encourage socially responsible behaviour by the party which has received the 
investment capital.155 
These techniques typically go under the names of ‘screening’ and ‘engagement’. 
Screening effectively biases the stock selection process to ensure that suitable firms are 
deliberately included (positive screening) and/or unsuitable firms are deliberately 
excluded (negative screening).156 
Engagement is an increasingly important aspect of SRI whereby an investor 
might invest in (or at least not disinvestment from) an unsuitable firm but, rather, the 
investor will engage with that company at the relevant opportunities in order to 
persuade the company to change its behaviour.157 
In practice, according to a survey conducted in 2002, two thirds of investment 
fund managers currently employ both approaches for the SRI equity funds they run.158 
SRIs are becoming an important funding opportunity, particularly for firms in 
the South, since social mutual funds retail more than USD 1.5 billion every year in the 
United States, searching for profitable but also socially responsible opportunities to 
invest in firms mainly from developing countries.159  In Europe, 313 green, social and 
ethical funds retailed more than 12.2 billion Euros worth in assets in 2003.160  
Therefore, another strategically motivated reason for CSR is future access to 
funds. Companies may contribute to building a market, or gain access to resources that 
increase profits.161  
                                                 
154  MANSLEY, M. (2000), Socially Responsible Investment,  p. 2. 
155  Idem, pp. 3-5. 
156  Idem, p. 3. 
157  Idem, pp 3-4. 
158  DELOITTE , F. and TOUCHE , M. (2002), Socially Responsible Investment Survey, p. 5. 
159  CHENG, J. and SOUSA-SHIELDS, M. (2003), Microfinance and Socially Responsible Investment in 
Latin America, p. 14. 
160  See www.sricompass.org.  
161  Idem, p. 47 
 
 
 
 
 27
According to a study in June 2005, at least 2,600 companies worldwide are 
publishing stand-alone citizenship, sustainability, environmental and social reports to 
have access to these funds.162  
Employees 
Many studies have shown that investing in employees can bring direct benefits 
to a company, both financially and in terms of increased employee loyalty and 
productivity. Such investment can include schemes such as provision of childcare 
facilities, flexible work hours and job sharing. Employee investment is an essential 
aspect of CSR, as the workforce is also the community; especially in smaller companies 
where a substantial proportion of employees are likely to come from the local 
community. 163 
A company’s dedication to CSR can help to attract and retain employees. People 
want to work for a company that behaves in accordance with their own values and 
beliefs.164  In developed countries, employees are not just worried about promotion and 
salary any more. According to a study of The Cherenson Group, 78% of employees in 
United States would rather work for an ethical and reputable company than receive a 
higher salary.165 
Good social performance also provides companies with a competitive advantage 
when attracting a skilled workforce. Gaining access to highly skilled, high value labour 
likely to be stimulated by, and interested in, companies with well-developed CSR 
approaches is a strong motivating force.166 A recent study suggested that applicants, 
both in countries from the North and South, are more likely to pursue jobs from socially 
responsible companies than from companies with poor social performance 
reputations.167 The study found that applicants might have a higher self-image when 
working for socially responsive companies.168 
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2.4 Hypotheses 
Within the theoretical framework described, this thesis will attempt to answer 
the research questions stating that: 
• Hypothesis 1: Increasing competition led less well-positioned MFIs to 
undertake CSR for strategic (instrumental) reasons.  
• Hypothesis 2: Considering the descriptive approach to stakeholder theory, 
CSR was adopted by those MFIs whose powerful stakeholders have 
relatively more social legitimacy. 
• Hypothesis 3:  CSR was adopted by those MFIs who already are performing 
better according to CSR standards, having a better initial competitive 
advantage. 
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
 
 
Three Commercial MFIs in Bolivia are taken as case study, two currently 
adopting CSR and one not. 
The study describes the “Bolivian case”, including the movement from social 
financial NGOs to private microfinance institutions. For the field research, secondary 
data from the MFIs was reviewed (business plans, acts, and minutes) and interviews 
with managerial staff were conducted to address the motives behind the adoption of 
CSR in the three MFIs selected. Focus groups were designed and conducted to prioritise 
stakeholders in the MFIs selected, and to assess CSR performance in these institutions. 
The following paragraphs detail the methodology used in the investigation, 
particularly on the field research. 
 
 
3.1 Case Study 
As was mentioned in the introduction, two out of five commercial MFIs are 
currently adopting CSR in Bolivia. This initiative is executed as a pilot project 
promoted by a Programme of the Swiss Cooperation (PROFIN-COSUDE), ending with 
the publication of the organisations’ first social balance sheet. The project is supervised 
by the Bolivian Corporation of CSR, Fundación Emprender and the Global Reporting 
Initiative (GRI), one of the world’s leading organisations in transparency and CSR 
information reporting (see www.globalreporting.org).  
For the proposes of the present thesis, these two MFIs (FIE FFP and 
ECOFUTURO FFP, both non-banking regulated financial institutions) were taken as 
case study, as well as Banco Los Andes Procredit which is not adopting CSR.  
Among the three MFIs not embarking on CSR, Banco Los Andes was chosen as 
case study due mainly to its willingness to offer information regarding its current CSR 
performance. Any of the other two MFIs, BancoSol or Prodem, would have been 
functional for the present thesis but the access to institutional data and top managers 
were crucial to gather comparable data between MFIs for this research. 
Having the three non-CSR MFIs would have been the best methodological 
scenario to compare results. Nevertheless, to have only Banco Los Andes is probably 
the second-best option. The bank, a former NGO, is now one of the market leaders in 
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Bolivia and it is described often as a “no-nonsense, focused financial institution”.169 
Therefore, it is more than interesting to compare the bank with the small non-banking 
MFIs engaging in CSR. For further information, Annex A describes the main features of 
the five MFIs.  
3.2 Operationalisation of Variables  
Given the hypotheses proposed, the following variables were considered: 
Table 1. Variables Operationalisation 
 Independent Variables Dependent Variables 
H 1: V1: Competition and market positioning V2: View or approach to CSR 
H 2: V4: Attribute of stakeholders V3: Adoption of CSR 
H 3: V5: CSR performance  V3: Adoption of CSR 
Variable 1: Competition and market positioning 
To measure competition in the Bolivian microfinance market, two indicators 
were taken from the International Monetary Fund’s “Financial Sector Assessment: A 
Handbook”. 170  
• Market coverage: Number of clients served/number of micro and small 
entrepreneurs. 
• Average real interest: Declining interest rates in MFIs means increasing 
competition. 
For comparison purposes, these indicators were also applied to other Latin 
American countries with mature microfinance markets, such as Ecuador, Peru and 
Colombia.  
Other indicators that suggest competition in financial markets, such as an 
improvement of client service quality, a diversification in lending products and the 
broadening of the target group; were discussed only for the Bolivian microfinance 
industry. This approach was adopted because most of these indicators have no 
established benchmarking (It is methodological misleading to affirm that the quality of 
service or the diversification of financial products is better/deeper in a particular 
country rather than in another).   
Regarding market positioning, the share of portfolio (loans and clients) of each 
MFI was analysed as a proxy.  
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Variable 2: View or approach to CSR 
The MFIs’ view of CSR can be either normative or strategic. Interviews with 
managers and members of the board of directors were conducted in order to assess the 
reasons behind (a) why two MFIs are engaging in CSR and (b) the motives why one 
MFI did not feel the necessity to do the same. 
Variable 3: Adoption of CSR 
This variable was given. Currently, FIE and Ecofuturo are the two MFIs 
adopting CSR out of the five commercial MFIs in Bolivia.  As has already been 
indicated, Banco Los Andes was selected from the three non-CSR MFIs as part of the 
case study.  
Variable 4: Stakeholders’ Attributes 
First, focus groups with top-executives of the three institutions were conducted, 
in order to prioritise the most important stakeholders for each institution. Secondly, the 
following attributes were analysed for the most important stakeholders identified: 
• Power: Resource dependency theory emphasizes that firms will respond positively 
to a stakeholder request if the organisation feels that when not doing so it can 
hamper the availability of actual or future funds or services. In this respect 
stakeholders’ resources available for investment in microfinance and their ability to 
hinder the access to the future funds will be a relevant indicator.   
• Legitimacy: the term is defined as a generalised perception or assumption that the 
actions of an entity are desirable, proper or appropriate within some socially 
constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions.  Probably, legitimacy 
is best measured by perceptions of the public, but – due to financial and time 
constraints – the present investigation proposes to operationalise legitimacy through 
a) the mission and values of the stakeholders analysed; and b) through the 
perception of the MFIs' managers about the legitimacy of these stakeholders, based 
on previous studies such as Agle, et. al.171  
Variable 5: CSR Performance 
The present thesis adopted the Self-application Guide of CSR Indicators of the 
Ethos Institute and the Argentinean Institute of CRS (www.iarse.org) as a measurement 
tool. The Guide consists of 35 modules with grading and binary indicators which help to 
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measure seven main CSR themes: (1) Values, Transparency and Governance; (2) 
Workforce; (3) Environment; (4) Suppliers; (5) Customers and Consumers; (6) 
Community; and (7) Government and Society. 
The guide was distributed to three top executives of the MFIs selected. They 
were asked to grade the different indicators, first separately and then in a focus group in 
order to promote discussion and agreement on the indicators. 
3.3 Methods of Data Collection 
During the research phase of the thesis data were gathered from primary and 
secondary sources, with the aim of collecting all the relevant information to measure the 
proposed variables. 
3.3.1 Secondary Data 
Information about competition and market positioning was found mainly in the 
MFIs’ internal and public reports, including annual reports (yearbooks), and reports to 
the Superintendence of Banks, among others. Webpages of different organizations were 
consulted to measure variables across microfinance markets in Latin America: these 
webpages included those of the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (member of the 
World Bank), MixMarket, Accion International and Micro enterprises Best Practices, 
among others.   
Internal documents, such as the yearly strategic plan of the MFIs, helped to give 
an indication of the stakeholder management approach of the institutions. 
Annual reports and reports of stakeholders were consulted to collect information 
to measure the power of the stakeholders identified. 
3.3.2 Primary Data 
Personal interviews and focus groups, as main method of primary data 
collection, were used to gather quantitative and qualitative information. Key managerial 
personnel of the MFIs and relevant (identified) representatives of stakeholders were 
interviewed, using: 
• A Quantitative Interview, with standardized, close-ended questions. Mainly 
found in the Guide of CRS indicators. 
• A Qualitative Interview, with a guided and structured approach, including a 
protocol listing possible open-ended questions. 
The information collected as quantitative data was used to compare the 
stakeholder management and the CSR performance among MFIs; while qualitative data 
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helped to collect information about the MFIs’ perception about the legitimacy of 
stakeholders and their motives for engaging in CSR. 
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CHAPTER 4: FINDINGS 
 
 
The present chapter is divided according to the hypotheses proposed for the 
research. A summary of the main findings is presented below.  
Regarding the incidence of competition on CSR adoption. 
 Taking market coverage and decreases in active interest rates as relevant 
indicators for competition, data analysed from secondary sources showed that Bolivia 
has the most competitive microfinance industry in Latin America. Competition 
produced other positive effects such as improvements in the quality of client service and 
diversification in lending products.  
Analysing the market share, figures concluded that the less well-positioned 
organisations in the market are the ones currently engaging in Corporate Social 
Responsibility (Ecofuturo and FIE), while Banco Los Andes is, with BancoSol, one of 
the leader firms in the industry.  
According to interviews conducted with top MFIs executives to measure CSR 
adoption, the less well-positioned organisations in the market, currently engaging in 
Corporate Social Responsibility, regard CSR as a strategic management tool that could 
improve their reputation and help them gain a competitive advantage. Banco Los 
Andes, on the other hand, argued that CSR was not appropriate for the organization “at 
the moment”, given that all its efforts were concentrated on microfinance.  
Regarding Stakeholders Incidence on CSR Adoption. 
Power and legitimacy were proposed as relevant indicators for stakeholders’ 
attributes, following the descriptive view of stakeholder theory.  After analysing their 
influence on the availability of actual or future funds or services for each MFI, 
shareholders and other funding sources were found to be the most powerful 
stakeholders among the main stakeholders identified by the MFIs through focus groups. 
Measuring legitimacy amongst the powerful stakeholders, the analysis presented 
found that FIE and Ecofuturo have more socially legitimate shareholders, while FIE and 
Banco Los Andes maintain greater loans from more socially legitimate funding sources. 
 Interviews conducted with the top executives of the MFIs and information 
gathered from secondary sources showed that MFIs engaging in CSR had an important 
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influence from socially legitimate stakeholders to initiate the process of transparent 
reporting of CSR, mainly from shareholders. 
Ecofuturo had their main advocates for CSR in founder NGOs. FIE was also  
influenced by a minor funding sources, to start more than one pilot project related to 
CSR. On the other hand, powerful and legitimate stakeholders, given their preferences, 
influenced Banco Los Andes to engage in activities more related to environmental 
sustainability. 
Regarding CSR Base Line and CSR Adoption 
The CSR base line was measured by the Ethos CSR Appraisal Tool in order to 
determine which firm is likely to perform better on a potential social balance sheet, 
addressing if Ecofuturo and FIE have a starting competitive advantage over Banco Los 
Andes. 
Taking into account the seven broad themes proposed by the Ethos indicators, 
the data analysis conducted indicates that Banco Los Andes performs better than FIE 
and Ecofuturo by CSR standards. Considering this, it can be concluded that the MFI not 
undertaking CSR has a better starting point than the two firms participating in the CSR 
pilot project, according to Ethos’ CSR standards. 
 
 
4.1 The Incidence of Competition on CSR Adoption  
4.1.1 Competition 
The dominance of commercial MFIs in Latin America represents a shift from a 
decade ago when microcredit in the region was dominated by microfinance NGOs.172 
The process is also a change in the view of the best model to facilitate the access 
to financial services for low income people since it is argued that it leads to a growing 
degree of competition.173 In Bolivia, as the following paragraphs describe, competition 
has increased to the point that real (and expected) effects have taken place, from 
improvements in the quality of client service, to diversification in lending products, to a 
broadened definition of target group, to decreases in the interest rates charged on loans. 
The next points detail the commercialisation process and how it led to greater levels of 
market development in Bolivia and in the region. 
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4.1.1.1 Commercialization in Latin America 
In microfinance circles, Bolivia is often thought of as the model for commercial 
microfinance. In 1992, BancoSol became the first transformed microlender in the world 
and by the mid-1990s it generated performance indicators that placed the MFI at the top 
of the Bolivian banking industry.174 The model was propagated throughout Latin 
America and by 2004 forty seven commercial MFIs held 48% of the clients and 53% of 
the portfolio. Table 2 details the most important commercial MFIs in the region.  
Table 2. Principal Commercial MFIs in Latin America as of Dec. 2004 
INSTITUTION   Country 
Outstanding 
Microloans 
($000) Clients 
Average 
Loan US$ * 
 Compartamos   Mexico   102,034 309,637 330
 Mibanco  Peru   111,966 92,236 1,214
 Banco Solidario (BancoSol)   Bolivia   103,888 91,805 1,132
 Banco Los Andes Procredit   Bolivia   116.579 84.887 1,.373
 Calpia/Banco Procredit    El Salvador 128.277 81.229 1.579
 Banco Solidario    Ecuador   114.342  60.385**   959
 Prodem  FFP  Bolivia   108.560 67.933 1.598
 CMAC Piura    Peru   113.699 64.698 1.757
 Confia / Banco Procredit    Nicaragua  86.495 56.618 1.528
 Edpyme Edificar  Peru   60.537 54.858 1.104
Source: MARULANDA, B et al, (2005), The Profile of Microfinance in Latin America in 10 Years: Vision & Characteristics, p.10. 
* The average loan is estimated as the outstanding loans divided by number of clients. 
**Reflects Banco Solidario's microloan clients & portfolio. Total clients all financial products:119,390 
 
As the table shows, Bolivian commercial MFIs are in the same company as 
entities such as Mibanco in Peru, Calpiá in El Salvador, and Compartamos in Mexico. 
Some of these microfinance institutions have converted into regulated non-banking 
entities that operate on special regulatory norms, as in the case of four “Fondos 
Financieros Privados-FFPs” (Private Financial Funds) in Bolivia, “Financiera” Calpiá in 
El Salvador and fourteen “EDPyMES” in Peru.175  During the last two years, Caja los 
Andes FFP in Bolivia and Calpiá in Salvador have further converted into commercial 
banks to give them both a competitive edge and to be able to provide a wider range of 
services to their clientele.  
In 2003, 18 of the world’s 21 most profitable MFIs operated in Latin America, 
all of them holding a return on equity larger than the average of the 10 best performing 
banks in the world.176 
Commercial MFIs are joined by a group of entities that maintained their NGO 
status, yet are still achieving high levels of financial sustainability and scale in their 
                                                 
174  RHYNE, E. (2001): Commercialization and Crisis in Bolivian Microfinance, pp. 5-6 
175  POYO, J. et.al., (1999), Commercialization of Microfinance: A Conceptual Framework for Latin America, 
pp 5-16. 
176  MIXMARKET (2005), The Microbanking Bulletin, p. 21. 
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outreach. As table 3 illustrates, some of these organizations even maintain a larger 
portfolio than some regulated institutions in the region. 
Table 3. Principal Microfinance NGOs in Latin America as of Dec. 2004 
INSTITUTION    Country   
Outstanding 
Microloans 
($000) Clients 
Average 
Loan US$ * 
 Fund. WWB Colombia/Cali   Colombia   66.122 92.533 715
 Fund. Mundo Mujer / Popayan    Colombia   29.849 86.816 344
 FMM Bucaramanga    Colombia   19.785 49.014 404
 Crecer    Bolivia   12.271 46.565 264
 Génesis    Guatemala   25.798 42.491 607
 Adopem  Dominican Rep.   18.385 39.933 460
 Promujer    Bolivia   5.587 38.587 145
 Corp. Mundial de la Mujer   Colombia   14.466 34.918 414
 Fund. Mario Santo Domingo    Colombia   10.596 34.585 306
 FAMA    Nicaragua   16.225 31.672 512
Source: MARULANDA, B et al, (2005), The Profile of Microfinance in Latin America in 10 Years: Vision & Characteristics, p.11. 
* The average loan is estimated as the outstanding loans divided by number of clients. 
 
In the majority of these cases, the decision to remain as non-profit institutions 
has been made because of the desire to provide not just financial services to their clients 
but also to complement those services with training and capacity building, among 
others. For instance, CRECER and PROMUJER in Bolivia offer health and education 
services, entirely financed by their village banking operations. 
At the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the new century, the whole 
microfinance panorama in Latin America has been enriched by the entrance of some 
commercial banks, attracted to serve this market specifically by the success achieved by 
commercial MFIs.177 Table 4 incorporates all actors to show the microfinance industry 
composition in Latin America. 
Table 4. Microfinance Industry Composition in Latin America as of Dec. 2004 
TYPE OF 
INSTITUTION    No. 
Outstanding  
Microloans ($000) Clients 
Average 
Loan US$ * 
 Commercial Banks   17  1.175.232 847.498 1.387 
 Commercial MFIs 47  1.790.373  1.540.920 1.162 
 NGOs   56 384,045 868,544 442 
 Total   120  3.349.650  3.256.962 1.028 
Source: MARULANDA, B et al, (2005), The Profile of Microfinance in Latin America in 10 Years: Vision & Characteristics, p.6. 
* The average loan is estimated as the outstanding loans divided by number of clients. 
 
As table 4 shows, commercial MFIs hold the biggest client outreach and 
outstanding portfolio, while NGOs still make up the majority of microfinance providers 
in Latin America. NGOs also maintain the lowest average loan size, showing that they 
focus more on poorer clients than their regulated competitors do. However, analysing 
                                                 
177  The most important commercial banks dedicated to microfinance operates in Chile (Banco del Estado 
Microempresa, Banco Santander Banafé y Banco del Desarrollo), Brazil (Banco do Nordeste) and  Ecuador (Banco 
Solidario and Banco Pichincha). See POYO, J. et.al., (1999), Commercialization of Microfinance: A Conceptual 
Framework for Latin America, p 10. 
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the number of loans by loan category (see Graph 1 below), one notices that while the 
NGOs disburse the largest percentage of their loans in the US$500 and below range, 
there is not much of a difference from commercial MFIs.  
Graph 1. Distribution of the Number of Credits Disbursed in 2004 by Size of Loan 
    
Source: MARULANDA, B et al, (2005), The Profile of Microfinance in Latin America in 10 Years: Vision & Characteristics, p.27. 
 
Many agree that the bigger average loan size in commercial MFIs is an outcome 
of more “mature” clients in the portfolio (long term customers with larger loans) and the 
introduction of new products that require higher amounts (for example housing).178 In 
fact, commercial MFIs –due to bigger loan portfolios and economies of scale- 
concentrate more microloans (under US$ 500) than NGOs (616.368 compared to 
416.901).179 
4.1.1.2 Measuring Competition 
Most microfinance practitioners argue that the process of commercialisation 
observed in Latin America is closely linked to increasing degrees of competition in 
local markets among providers of financial services for the poor.180  
That is particularly the case in Bolivia where a mature market meets 
demographics. Bolivia has some of the most important MFIs in the region (in portfolio 
and client’s outreach terms – see tables 1 and 2), though it has a smaller population (9 
million inhabitants) compared to other leading microfinance countries such as Peru (27 
million), Chile (16 million) or Colombia (46 million).181  
To assess and compare the level of competition among countries, two indicators 
from the IMF’s “Financial Sector Assessment: A Handbook” are proposed: market 
                                                 
178  MARULANDA, B et al, (2005), The Profile of Microfinance in Latin America in 10 Years: Vision & 
Characteristics, p.28. 
179  Figures extracted with data showed in graph 1 and table 3.  
180  PECK CHRISTENSEN, R. and DRAKE, D. (2003), Commercialization: The New Reality of 
Microfinance, p 4. 
181  ECLAC (2002), Boletín Demográfico No. 69. América Latina y Caribe: Estimaciones y Proyecciones de 
Población. 1950-2050, p.11. 
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coverage and interest rates.182 Other indicators that suggest competition in financial 
markets, such as improvement of client service quality, broadening of the target group 
and diversification in lending products are only discussed for the Bolivian microfinance 
industry.  
Market coverage and interest rates 
The work of Westley (2001) was used to determine the market coverage in every 
country.183 Westley estimated the microenterprise market in the diverse countries of the 
region by including those businesses with fewer than three employees. The potential 
demand was estimated at approximately 50% of those businesses identified by Westley. 
It is also acknowledge that since this number does not account for lower income 
families operating outside the microenterprise sector, figures are likely to underestimate 
the total size of the market for all countries. 
Looking at the numbers in table 5, a conservative estimate would show that 
Bolivian microfinance institutions are serving approximately 56% of the potential 
market, a situation that clearly differs from the average for all countries together 
(14.7%) and from that of the others countries considered individually – with Chile as 
the second most successful country serving approximately 28% of the potential market. 
Table 5. Coverage of the Potential Market by Country184 
COUNTRY   
Estimated size of the 
market (Number of 
microenterprises.) 
Market being covered 
2004 (clients served by 
MFIs) (%) Coverage 
 Bolivia            681.160        379.713   55.7% 
 Chile            603.590        168.799   28.0% 
 El Salvador            333.590          89.427   26.8% 
 Paraguay            493.660          82.658   16.7% 
 Peru         3.433.095        899.196   26.2% 
 Colombia         3.250.900        442.109   13.6% 
 Mexico         5.136.950        347.874   6.8% 
 Dom. Republic           696.090          70.602   10.1% 
 Honduras            445.590          17.356   3.9% 
 Venezuela         1.623.635          13.368   0.8% 
 Guatemala            710.855          42.491   6.0% 
 Total   17.409.115 2.553.593  14.7% 
Source: WESTLEY, G. (2001), Can Financial Market Policy Reduce Income Inequality?, p 6.  
              MARULANDA, B et al, (2005), The Profile of Microfinance in Latin America in 10 Years: Vision & Characteristics, p. 14. 
 
Most agree that this market saturation has made Bolivia one of the world's most 
competitive and rapidly changing microfinance markets, improving efficiency and 
reducing interest rates.185  
                                                 
182   IMF (2005), Financial Sector Assessment: A Handbook, p. 18. 
183  WESTLEY, G. (2001), Can Financial Market Policy Reduce Income Inequality?, p 6. 
184  The Nicaraguan market is excluded since using the Westley data, along with that compiled by Otero, 
would show market coverage of 98%, which, according to Otero herself, is far from true (xxx). 
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Pedro Arriola – General Manager of Banco Los Andes Procredit- argues that 
“interest rates were significantly lower for clients as a result of the increased efficiency 
achieved by (microfinance) institutions that took advantage of their economies of scale 
serving as intermediaries for a larger volume of resources”.186  
To investigate this contention, the average active interest rate for the microcredit 
portfolio of Bolivian commercial MFIs was analysed. Table 6 details the comparison 
amongst the most important commercial MFIs and NGOs in the region. 
Table 6. Average Gross Return for Microcredit Portfolio in Latin American MFIs 
INSTITUTION Country 
Portfolio 
Gross 
Return INSTITUTION Country 
Portfolio 
Gross 
Return 
 Compartamos    Mexico   87,50%  CMAC Santa    Peru   35,90%
 Fincomun    Mexico   80,22%  Confianza    Peru   35,47%
 D-Miro    Ecuador   46,08%  Nueva Vision    Peru   35,39%
 WWB Popayan    Colombia   41,85%  Pro- Mujer    Bolivia   34,48%
 Procredit     Nicaragua  41,27%  Nieborowski    Nicaragua   33,64%
Findesa Nicaragua 40,79%  CMAC Ica    Peru   33,11%
Proempresa Peru 40,73%  CMAC Arequipa   Peru   33,06%
 WWB Bucaramanga    Colombia   40,70%  WWB Cali    Colombia   32,68%
 Crear Arequipa    Peru   40,45%  CMAC Trujillo    Peru   30,91%
 WWB Bogota    Colombia   38,92%  CMAC Tacna    Peru   30,48%
 WWB Medellin    Colombia   38,89%  CMAC Cusco    Peru   28,17%
 CMAC Sullana    Peru   37,65%  D-Frif    Bolivia   27,85%
 Edyficar    Peru   36,99%  Banco Procredit    El Salvador   22,07%
 
INSTITUTION Portfolio Gross Return 
 Average Bolivian Commercial MFIs*  21,76% 
Source: ASOFIN (2005), Resumen Institucional Junio 2005, p. 16 
* includes BancoSol, Banco Los Andes, FIE, Ecofuturo and Prodem 
 
In 1992, before the formalization of commercial MFIs, the average active 
interest rate for microcredits in these organisations was above 37%.187 By 2004, 
commercial MFIs reduced their active interest rates by 16 percentage points to an 
average of 21.56%, the lowest among Latin American MFIs according to the Rating 
Agency MixMarket (See table 6).  
According to the IMF, a more developed and competitive market leads to 
decreasing active interest rates in financial institutions.188 That is certainly the case with  
the microfinance industry in Bolivia. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
185  NAVAJAS, S (2002) et al, Lending Technologies, Competition, and Consolidation in the Market for 
Microfinance in Bolivia, p. 6. 
186  ARRIOLA, P., (2003), Microfinance in Bolivia: History and Current Situation, p. 17. 
187  ASOFIN (2005), Resumen Institucional Junio 2005, p. 16 
188  IMF (2005), Financial Sector Assessment: A Handbook, p. 18. 
 
 
 
 
 41
Innovation and client outreach 
In this country, the saturation of the market also led to product and quality 
service innovation and to a broadened definition of the microfinance market. 
Regarding the lending technology, the established solidarity group credit 
imported by pioneer NGOs from Bangladesh’s Grammeen Bank was complemented by 
individual loans, tailored to more productive micro-entrepreneurs.189 In this lending 
technology the MFI spends substantially more resources in screening applicants and 
asks borrowers to pledge household assets as collateral, even though it is evident that 
seizing these valuables (e.g., sofa, television set, refrigerator) typically would yield 
relatively little to the lender.190  In December 2004, 65% of the total MFIs’ portfolio 
was disbursed in individual loans, while 23% went to credit groups.191  
At the same time, MFIs also began to seek new market niches to diversify their 
portfolio and be able to reduce the impact of systemic risks.192  
Non-regulated NGOs took advantage of their “room to manoeuvre” and 
developed unconventional microfinance products such us financial leasing193, venture 
capital194 and warrant195, among others. 
On the other hand and due to their regulated status, commercial MFIs offered a 
more ample range of products and services such as savings, remittances, on line 
transfers, payments and the collection of taxes, credit and debit cards.196  Regarding the 
lending products, commercial MFIs noticed that while group lending provided working 
capital to microentreprenuers, individual credit could be adapted to offer investment 
capital, housing, consumer credit and credit lines.197  
One breakthrough in service innovation is probably Prodem’s smart Automatic 
Teller Machine (ATM).198  
                                                 
189  NAVAJAS, S (2002) et al, Lending Technologies, Competition, and Consolidation in the Market for 
Microfinance in Bolivia, p. 6. 
190  GONZALEZ-VEGA, C, (1997), Microempresas y Servicios Financieros, pp. 13-27. 
191  ASOFIN (2005), Resumen Institucional Junio 2005, p. 16 
192  GONZALEZ-VEGA, C, (1997), Microempresas y Servicios Financieros, pp. 13-27. 
193   See NGO ANED’s experience. NAIR, J, et.al. (2005), Leasing: An Underutilized Tool in Rural Finance, 
pp 1. 47. 
194  See NGO PROCREDITO’s Experience. SOIS FAM (2004), Venture Capital in Bolivia: An Alternative for 
Rural Financing?, pp.1-8. 
195   Warrant is a derivative security that gives the holder the right to purchase securities (usually equity) from 
the issuer at a specific price within a certain time frame. Warrants are often included in a new debt issue as a 
"sweetener" to entice investors. See NGO FONDECO’s Experience. COLLAO, M (2004), Warrant y Microwarrant: 
Alternativas de garantía para el pequeño productor, Centro AFIN, Cuaderno de Trabajo 4, pp 1-53. 
196  POYO, J. et.al., (1999), Commercialization of Microfinance: A Conceptual Framework for Latin America, 
p. 15. 
197  ASOFIN (2005), Resumen Institucional Junio 2005, p. 2. 
198  Prodem FFP was established as an NGO in 1986 by ACCION International. Since 1999, it has been a 
regulated non-banking institution and today is the MFI holding the largest rural outreach in Bolivia, with 79 
branches. See complete profile in Annex A. 
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Prodem has designed its own ATM, tailored to meet the needs of its rural 
customers. The company provides its clients with a smart card, so that the ATMs are 
able to verify the customer's identity through fingerprint scanning and complete 
transactions without being electronically connected to the central office, thereby 
allowing Prodem to expand its reach into remote areas.199 
Moreover, the ATMs are capable of "speaking" to their users in their local 
language, thus enabling illiterate customers to access their services. Audio instructions 
are currently available in Spanish, Quechua, or Aymara. Combined with a touch screen 
interface, customers are able to deposit and withdraw funds without filling out a deposit 
slip or withdrawal form.200 Additionally, the ATMs facilitate money transfers, provide 
access to government programs that provide work for low-skill workers, and make 
payments to senior citizens.201 
As competition amongst lenders intensified and the microfinance market 
matured, it was expected to see not only increased outreach and product innovation but 
also substantial market consolidation. The next section details the microfinance market 
composition in Bolivia, in order to determine the more and less well-positioned MFIs in 
the country. 
4.1.1.3 Market Consolidation – MFIs Positioning 
The development of the microfinance market in Bolivia may be usefully divided 
into three stages. The first stage was characterized by the dominance of BancoSol. 
Created in 1992 as a commercial bank, from the client base developed since 1987 by 
Prodem, its NGO predecessor, BancoSol established an early presence through the 
extensive use of its group lending technology.202 
The second stage was marked by the emergence in 1995, as a new microlender 
and serious competitor, of Caja Los Andes, the first FFP established in Bolivia on the 
basis of the NGO Procredito. In contrast to BancoSol, Caja Los Andes uses individual 
lending technology.203 
                                                 
199  HERNANDEZ R., et al., (2003), What Works: Prodem FFP'S Multilingual Smart ATMs for Microfinance, 
p. 3. 
200  Idem, p.6. 
201  Prodem's ATM software was developed by a subsidiary of Prodem, Innova Empresarial, which specializes 
in technology and consulting services. In addition, Innova is in the process of developing Palm technology that would 
enable Prodem to take their financial services, via a handheld, into local homes and businesses of their customers. 
Idem, p. 7. 
202  NAVAJAS, S (2002) et al, Lending Technologies, Competition, and Consolidation in the Market for 
Microfinance in Bolivia, p. 6. 
203  SOLARES, M., (1997), Caja de Ahorro y Préstamo Los Andes, in: Gonzalez-Vega C., Prado F., Miller T. 
(Eds.), El Reto de las Microfinanzas en América Latina: la Visión Actual, Corporación Andina de Fomento,  pp. 111-
120. 
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BancoSol dominated the market until 1994, but since then, both BancoSol and 
Caja Los Andes greatly expanded the scale of their operations. Although Caja Los 
Andes grew in part by reaching some larger clients that BancoSol might have reached 
with an individual lending technology, it is evident that their clienteles substantially 
overlapped. Many of Los Andes’ new clients had moved from BancoSol, but the 
evidence suggests that BancoSol had captured rather few borrowers in return, even after 
several years of competition.204 
The third stage, starting in 1998, was characterized by increasing competition 
from newly transformed FFPs: FIE (transformed in 1998), EcoFuturo (formed in 1999 
by a group of 4 NGOs, FADES, IDEPRO, ANED, and CIDRE) and Prodem 
(incorporated in 2000).205  
Ever since the transformation of BancoSol in 1992, commercial MFIs started to 
dominate the industry, accounting for most of the portfolio growth (Graph 2). In June 
2005, commercial MFIs held 84% of the total outstanding microfinance portfolio. 
Graph 2. Evolution of the Outstanding Portfolio of Bolivian MFIs ($000,000) 
 
 
Source: ASOFIN (2005), Resumen Institucional Junio 2005, p. 3 and ARRIOLA, P., (2003), Microfinance in Bolivia: History and 
Current Situation, p. 2. 
 
Today, the microfinance industry in Bolivia is still primarily in the hands of the 
two pioneer lenders. By June 2005, BancoSol and Banco Los Andes Procredit (former 
Caja Los Andes FFP) were the two largest microlenders in Bolivia with 77.461 and 
72.048 borrowers respectively. Together, they share around 56% of the commercial 
MFIs’ clients (See Table 7). 
                                                 
204  GONZALEZ-VEGA, C., et.al., (1996), Microfinance Market Niches and Client Profiles in Bolivia, p. 3. 
205  See the complete institutions’ profile in Annex A. 
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Table 7. Commercial MFIs’ Market Positioning as of June 2005 
  Clients Outstanding Portfolio 
Commercial MFI Number (%) Thousand US$ (%) 
BancoSol 77.461 29% 113.907 28% 
Banco Los Andes 72.048 27% 128.471 31% 
Prodem FFP 61.838 23% 94.453 23% 
FIE FFP 45.547 17% 59.594 14% 
Ecofuturo FFP 12.087 4% 15.920 4% 
TOTAL 268.981 100% 412.345 100% 
 Source: www.microfinanzasbolivia.com 
 
These are impressive numbers, as all commercial banks combined (not including 
BancoSol and Banco Los Andes) reached only 162.224 borrowers, less than the half of 
commercial MFIs’.206  
Despite its late entry, Prodem FFP holds nearly 25% of the commercial MFIs 
outstanding portfolio, leaving FIE FFP and Ecofuturo far behind in the market 
positioning with 14% and 4%.  
Consequently, it can be concluded that BancoSol and Banco Los Andes are the 
two market leaders, whereas FIE and Ecofuturo are the less well-positioned firms. 
4.1.2 Stakeholder (CSR) Approach by Commercial MFIs 
As the previous point describes, the commercialisation model led to a 
competitive and saturated microfinance market in Latin America and especially in 
Bolivia where the process began. Today, the microfinance landscape in the country is 
dominated by commercial MFIs. 
This thesis argues that the two less well-positioned commercial MFIs (Ecofuturo 
FFP and FIE FFP) are engaging in Corporate Social Responsibility for strategic reasons, 
trying to differentiate themselves (and their products) from their competitors, in order to 
gain market share and improve profits. 
The General Manager of Ecofuturo FFP, the Risk Manager of FIE FFP and the 
National Risk Manager of Banco Los Andes were interviewed to assess whether this 
hypothesis holds.207 Banco Los Andes was included as a comparison institution due to 
its leading position and since the organisation is not planning to undertake CSR in the 
short term. Annex B contains the model of the interviews conducted. 
Both Ecofuturo and FIE were very open to affirm that they are engaging in CSR 
for strategic reasons. Both agreed that the core motive for undertaking CSR was that it 
                                                 
206  ASOFIN (2005), Resumen Institucional Junio 2005, p. 3. 
207  Interviews were conducted between the 14th and 25th of October 2005. 
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can improve their social impact and also positively affect their financial performance, 
product differentiation from their competitors and relationship with their stakeholders.  
Moreover, they rejected the normative approach as a reason to undertake CSR. 
Both managers considered that it is not realistic to assume that MFIs must commit 
themselves to CSR regardless of the potential benefits and costs resulting from its 
implementation, and only because it is coherent with the mission/vision and nature of 
the organisations.  
Both institutions have social-driven missions208 and their managers affirmed that 
CSR was the next logical step in their institutional development as private institutions 
seeking financial and social performance. Nonetheless, they agree that embracing 
additional activities should be in concordance with the sustainable approach of the 
organisations. In fact, CSR was adopted after a careful assessment of costs and benefits 
were conducted in both institutions. 
 As the General Manager of Ecofuturo commented, CSR is handled directly by 
him and was already incorporated in Ecofuturo’s Business Plan for 2005. The concept 
was included in the plan mainly because of a recommendation by the Board of 
Directors, because all the members considered CSR as an opportunity for the institution 
to improve its image. 
Likewise, FIE is betting on a positive impact of CSR on the institution’s 
competitiveness. As its Risk Manager who is responsible for the CSR project argues, 
the firm is investing in client satisfaction and CSR can reinforce this work. She affirms 
that as “an issue of competitiveness, (CSR) is definitively something that can 
differentiate us (from the competition), since we have a disadvantage with competitors 
in technology, ATMs, etc., so a better image amongst our clients can benefit us 
greatly”.209 
The following table summarizes the reasons for engaging in CSR identified by 
both managers as the most important ones.  
Table 8. FIE’s and ECOFUTURO’s main reasons to engage in CSR  
(from 1 to 5 in importance) 
Indicator Ecofuturo FIE 
Improve the organizational image in order to attract more clients 5 5 
Access to Socially Responsible Investors 4 3 
Increase employees' productivity 4 4 
Improve the institution’s financial performance 4 4 
Source: Interviews based on model  in Annex B. 
                                                 
208  See the institutional description of the FIE and Ecofuturo in Annex A 
209  Interview with Elizabeth Nava, Risk Manager of FIE FFP. 
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The two managers were convinced that image and reputation are key variables 
to succeed in microfinance, referring to microfinance as “a competitive market where 
organisations serve poor people”. In this vein, both interviewees identified the 
improvement of the organisational image (as a mean to attract more clients, i.e., gain 
market share) as the main reason for engaging in CSR  
On the other hand, the National Risk Manager of Banco Los Andes Procredit 
confirmed that CSR was not appropriate for the organization “at the moment” given that 
all efforts were concentrated in microfinance, which is already social.  He believes that 
CSR could probably be considered by Banco Los Andes in the medium term to 
structure a better impact of other social activities besides microfinance. When asked 
about the potential competitiveness benefits from CSR adoption, he argued that CSR is 
in line with the institution’s social mission, but it was only considered for the medium 
term. 
4.1.3 Main Findings 
Latin America is the region where commercialisation of microfinance is the 
most developed. Less than 15 years since the first MFI was transformed, commercial 
MFIs hold the largest proportion of the microcredit portfolio and client outreach in the 
region. This process led to increasing levels of competition in local markets, particularly 
in the pioneer country –Bolivia.  
Taking market coverage and decreases in active interest rates as relevant 
indicators, Bolivia has the most competitive microfinance industry in Latin America. 
Competition produced other positive effects such as improvements in the quality of 
client service and diversification in lending products.  
According to interviews conducted with top MFIs executives, the organisations 
are not only trying to differentiate their financial products, but also their image towards 
clients. The less well-positioned organisations in the market, currently engaging in 
Corporate Social Responsibility, regard CSR as a strategic management tool to improve 
their reputation and gain competitive advantage in the market. They also affirm that 
CSR fits well to their institutional mission and vision, being the next logical step in their 
organisational development. 
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4.2 Influence of Stakeholders on CSR Adoption 
4.2.1 Stakeholders Identification and Prioritisation 
According to each organisation’s reality, mission and surrounding environment, 
stakeholders could act differently. 
A focus group in each institution was conducted in order to identify and, most 
importantly, prioritise the core stakeholders to FIE, Ecofuturo and Banco Los Andes,. 
First, it is important to recognise the support the present research had from all 
three the MFIs. The General Manager –  in the case of Ecofuturo –  and the National 
Risk Managers –  of FIE and Banco Los Andes –  were more than willing to participate. 
Focus groups included 3 to 5 executives selected by the MFIs themselves as 
personnel that could enrich the discussion and the identification of stakeholders. Annex 
C details the participants and the results of each focus group. 
Other executives were appointed according to their knowledge of the 
organisation or because their working area was considered as related to stakeholder 
management. For instance, the personnel responsible for the planning and the personnel 
responsible for human resources were thought important in Ecofuturo, while in FIE 
more “external” persons to the firm participated, such as the Vice-President of the 
Board of Directors, the Internal Auditor and the representative of the main shareholder. 
  The first part of the focus group was designed to identify the most important 
stakeholders in the MFIs. A brief presentation about CSR and its relationship with 
stakeholder management was conducted as an introduction to the exercise. Afterwards, 
each participant wrote on paper the core stakeholders in the firm, their interests in the 
firm and their relevance to the MFI, according to his/her understanding.  
The stakeholders identified by the personnel were discussed in a group session 
and summarised in a single matrix.210  Table 9 shows the main stakeholders identified 
by each MFI in the exercise.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
210  See Matrix 1 for each MFI in Annex C 
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Table 9. Stakeholders Identified by MFIs 
Stakeholder Stakeholder’s interests in the MFI Los Andes FIE Ecofuturo 
Shareholders Sustainability √ √ √ 
Clients (borrowers and 
savers) Access to quality services 
√ √ √ 
Directors Accomplish institutional goals √ √  
Funding Sources Profits and impact √ √ √ 
Employees Security and good work environment √ √ √ 
Microfinance Network Harmonise policies and promoteequilibrium  
√   
Community Donations and impact √ √ √ 
Suppliers Increase business  √ √ 
International Cooperation Impact   √ 
Government Taxes, regulation and control  √ √ 
Superintendence of Banks Regulation and supervision √  √ 
Source: Annex C 
 
As can be deduced from the table, some stakeholders were identified by all 
institutions and others not, reflecting that MFIs share the same surrounding environment 
but – at the same time – each organization has a different group of actors which they 
consider can affect or are affected by the firm. 
The second part of the focus group activities consisted of prioritising the 
stakeholders identified in the first Matrix. 
In a new matrix, the stakeholders were analysed collectively according to their 
relevance in 5 fields established by the strategic approach as determined when engaging 
in CSR and stakeholder management: (1) image and reputation improvement; (2) 
increase of number of clients; (3) better access to funding; (4) better relationship with 
the community; and (5) improvement in the employees’ motivation. The relevance of 
the different stakeholders in each field was discussed and measured by the group on a 
scale from 1 to 3 (1 low impact, 3 high impact).  
Table 10 summarises the 5 best ranked stakeholders according to their impact on 
the fields described. The prioritisation is detailed in Annex C.  
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Table 10. Stakeholders prioritised by MFIs 
STAKEHOLDER Los Andes* FIE* Ecofuturo* Total  
Clients (borrowers and savers) 15 10 14 39 
Employees 14 11 12 36 
Shareholders 15 10 10 35
Funding Sources 10 10 10 30 
Community 9 9 10 28 
Source: Annex C 
* Sum of levels of impact of stakeholders in the 5 fields (e.g., 15= the stakeholder scored 5 times as level 3 of impact)  
 
As the table illustrates, MFIs agreed that clients, employees, shareholders, 
funding sources, community and government were the core stakeholders of their 
organizations. 
The results show no surprises as these actors are important to any firm. In other 
industries, more in the eye of the public, NGOs or environmental and human rights 
groups could probably be identified as key stakeholders. MFIs do not face this public 
screening; therefore, the stakeholders prioritised are more “standard”.  
Regarding the fields of prioritisation, some were considered more important than 
others. The following table details the number of MFIs that ranked as high (3) the 
impact of stakeholders on the different fields of prioritisation.   
Table 11. Number of MFIs ranking stakeholders as having high impact on the 
prioritisation fields 
STAKEHOLDER 
Image and 
Reputation 
Improvement 
Increase in 
number of 
clients 
Better access 
to funding 
Better 
relations with 
the community
personnel’s 
motivation 
improvement 
Total 
Clients 3 3 3 3 1 13 
Employees 2 3 0 2 2 9 
Shareholders 2 1 3 1 1 8 
Funding Sources 3 0 3 0 0 6 
Community 3 0 0 3 0 6 
Total 13 7 9 9 4  
Source: Annex C 
 
Table 11 shows that MFIs believe that better stakeholder management could 
have a higher impact on the fields of image & reputation, access to funding and 
relations with the community.  
Particularly, all MFIs (except one in respect of employees and shareholders) 
consider that better stakeholder management could lead to a great improvement of the 
organisations’ Image and Reputation. This supports the conclusion of point 4.1: MFIs 
assume that CSR will improve their market positioning by creating a better image 
amongst clients. 
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Regarding stakeholders individually, clients were mentioned by most MFIs as 
having a high impact in the different fields proposed. In other words, all three MFIs 
believe that better stakeholder management of clients will have a high impact on 
reputation, increase the number of borrowers and savers, lead to better access to funding 
and better relations with the community, while only one MFI thinks that it will improve 
the motivation of personnel. Other stakeholders that scored relatively high were 
employees and shareholders. 
In sum, the focus groups conducted with the MFIs helped to identify 5 
stakeholders considered by the organisations as core to their interests, prioritised as 
follows: (1) clients, (2) employees, (3) shareholders, (4) funding sources, and (5) 
community.  
However, how could these stakeholders have affected the decision of FIE and 
Ecofuturo to engage in CSR?  Or not to engage in the case of Banco Los Andes? All 
firms can identify and prioritise their stakeholders (normally all firms do it formally or 
informally) but only a few undertake further steps towards social activities beyond their 
business operations.       
According to the descriptive approach to stakeholder theory, firms tend to 
engage in CSR due to the demands of powerful and legitimate stakeholders. The 
following section discusses the attributes of the 5 main stakeholders prioritised, 
analysing their power and legitimacy. 
4.2.2 Attributes of Main Stakeholders 
As proposed in the theoretical background, the main criteria for stakeholder 
elimination will be power. Only the most powerful stakeholders will be analysed by the 
legitimacy criteria in order to determine their incidence on CSR adoption by the MFIs 
studied.  
The next points conclude that this thesis will focus only on shareholders and 
funding sources as relevant stakeholders.  
4.2.2.1 Power Criteria 
In contrast to other industries, clients, employees and communities have no 
power (as defined in theory) on microfinance. The lack of organisation is the main 
problem.  
As was discussed in the definition of power (see page 17), a firm will respond 
positively to a stakeholder request if the organization feels that by not doing so it can 
 
 
 
 
 51
hamper the availability of actual or future funds or services. Therefore, a structured 
representation of interests and requests is critical to assign power to a stakeholder. 
In MFIs there are no unions or similar organised entities to represent employees. 
Even though there is a Bolivian Confederation of Banking Unions, this type of 
organisation does not exist in the microfinance sector and is rare in the financial sector 
in general.  One of the main reasons for this situation is that collective negotiations of 
salaries hardly ever take place in the industry and outsourced companies conduct most 
hiring.211   
Regarding clients, in 1999 an increasing problem of over-indebtedness in the 
microfinance market led to the creation of Small Debtors’ Associations in various parts 
of the country, but these were formed for specific reasons and their credibility did not 
last long.212 The leaders of these associations promised borrowers to write-off their 
debts, including both principal and interest. These associations organised increasingly 
violent demonstrations and protest marches directed against financial entities, including 
MFIs, banks and consumer credit entities, who were accused of abusive and humiliating 
practices against borrowers. 
The Superintendent of Banks examined the claims case by case. An analysis of 
the situation proved that the majority of the cases were not related to clients of MFIs, 
but rather to consumer credit “financieras”.  The results of the analysis even showed 
non-existent clients. 
In the same year, the Government, financial institutions and representatives of 
the debtors associations signed a first agreement. In spite of it, the conflict persisted and 
the actions of one of the largest debtors associations ended in July 2001 with the violent 
take-over of the Superintendence facilities and over 100 hostages. A few days later, this 
association, the Government, the guilds of financial entities and mediators, signed a 
framework agreement to resolve the conflict. 
It should be underscored that after these events, many borrowers left the 
associations, seeking dialogue with the institutions and a reasonable solution to their 
problems. Debtors realised that the promises made by the associations’ leaders were 
false and that they could not solve their problems through pressure. By 2001, the 
organisations disappeared. 
On the other hand, communities are - as an inherited characteristic from the Inca 
Period- a very important cohesive factor among indigenous people in the western part of 
                                                 
211  See Indymedia’s web page: http://bolivia.indymedia.org/es/newswire/archive411.shtml.  
212  FIEDLER, H. and PASTOR, F. (2002), Bolivian Microfinance in Times of Crises, p. 9. 
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the country, but lack a national or even regional organisation. Most “ayllus”, as these 
communities are called in the native language, live for the sole purpose of structuring 
communal work and rarely interact with other ayllus.213 
From the preceding paragraphs, one can conclude that the MFIs will not regard 
clients(except under extreme circumstances, as detailed above), employees and the 
community as powerful stakeholders, since they cannot affect the possibility of access 
to new funds. 
In contrast, shareholders and funding sources have a real impact on the 
availability of resources necessary for the MFIs’ survival.  
As the following graph shows, shareholders and funding sources represent an 
important portion of the MFIs portfolio funding. One could affirm that a MFI will 
respond positively to a request from these stakeholders if the organisation feels that 
when not doing so it can hinder the availability of actual or future funds. 
Graph 3. MFIs Portfolio Funding Composition (June 2005) 
8%
53%
36%
6%
41%
46%
9%
76%
13%
Banco Los
Andes
FIE Ecofuturo
Shareholders Savings Funding Sources
 
Source: Superintendence of Banks (2005), Boletín Informativo, p.43. 
 
Savings are the main source of portfolio funding in the MFIs analysed, while 
funding sources are more important in Banco Los Andes and FIE. But how legitimate 
are these stakeholders? How social-driven are their goals? 
This attribute is discussed in the next point, in order to assess whether FIE and 
Ecofuturo are under the influence of more legitimate social stakeholders than Banco 
Los Andes. 
                                                 
213  ANIBARRO, Jorge (1955),  El Cooperativismo y el mejoramiento de las Comunidades Indígenas de 
Bolivia, pp. 16-19. 
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4.2.2.2 Legitimacy 
In Bolivian commercial MFIs, shareholders are mainly NGOs, Development 
Banks, Bilateral Donors and Specialised Funds. The later consists of private funds in the 
North seeking investment opportunities in development fields in the South. 
The reasons for NGOs, Development Banks and Bilateral Donors investing in 
commercial MFIs are straightforward. They seek mainly to have a social impact but, 
due to the MFIs’ vision about microfinance, they believe that the organisation should  
also be sustainable in order to serve the beneficiaries better. What differentiates them 
from Specialised Funds is profit-seeking.214 
Some funds are specialised only in microfinance, such as Procredit Holding, 
Foundations Triodos-Doen and Hivos-Triodos, and Oikocredit, while others, such as 
ICCO, invest in several development fields. Except for ICCO and Triodos-Oden, which 
administer church and lottery funds respectively, Procredit Holding, Oikocredit and 
Hivos-Triodos are funded mostly by private investors.215 To some degree, all of them 
seek profitability in their investments in order to be sustainable.216 
Table 12 details the shareholder composition of FIE, Ecofuturo and Banco Los 
Andes.  
Table 12. MFIs Shareholder Composition,  
when transformed and as of June 2005 (%) 
OWNER Banco Los Andes FIE Ecofuturo 1995 06/2005 1998 06/2005 1999 06/2005 
Founder NGOs 37,5 14,6 59,5 49,3 89,7 78,3
International NGOs 43,7 - 15,0 - -
Development Banks - - - 9,5* - 12,3*
Bilateral Donors - - 10,0Ψ 5,9Ψ 7,0Ψ 4,2Ψ
Specialised Funds - 83,6Ω 23,2μ - 2,9φ
Private Individuals 18,8 1,8 15,5 12,1 3,3 2,3
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: NIMAL, F (2004), Micro success Story? Transformation of NGOs into Regulated Financial Institutions, p.12 
              Bolsa Boliviana de Valores, http://bolsa-valores-bolivia.com/listadeemisores1.htm. 
              Ecofuturo (1999), Memoria Anual, p.16. 
* Andean Development Corporation, Ψ Swiss Cooperation (COSUDE), Ω Procredit Holding,, μ Oikocredit , ICCO and 
Foundations Triodos-Deon and Hivos-Triodos, φ ICCO 
 
In June 2005, as the figures show, FIE and Ecofuturo had a bigger participation 
of NGOs, Development Banks and Bilateral Donors, compared to Banco Los Andes.  
                                                 
214  NIMAL, F (2004), Micro success Story? Transformation of NGOs into Regulated Financial Institutions, 
p.14 
215  See www.triodos.com, www.procredit-holding.com, www.oikocredit.org and www.icco.nl.  
216  NIMAL, F (2004), Micro success Story? Transformation of NGOs into Regulated Financial Institutions, 
p.15. 
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Moreover, Banco Los Andes reduced the participation of the founder NGO 
among shareholders by 61%, leaving Procredit Holding as the main stockholder. 
Though founder NGOs also reduced their proportional share of FIE and Ecofuturo, they  
are still the largest shareholders in both organisations. 
The importance of Specialised Funds in each institution varies. In Banco Los 
Andes, Procredit Holding is the major investor with 84% of the shares, while Triodos-
Deon and Hivos-Triodos, taken together, are the second largest owners in FIE with 13% 
of the firm’s stocks and Oikocredit the third with 8%.  ICCO holds 3% of the shares in 
both Ecofuturo and FIE.217  
Analysing the legal status of the most important investors, whereas both 
Triodos-Deon and Hivos-Triodos are foundations administered by Triodos Bank, 
Oikocredit and Procredit Holding are private companies, the latter run mainly by former 
employees of the founder-consulting firm: Internationale Projekt Consult.218 
From the overview of the data presented, it can be concluded that Ecofuturo has 
a more social-driven ownership, with NGOs, Development Banks and Bilateral Donors 
accounting for more than 90% of the shareholder composition and with founder NGOs 
holding near 80% of the stocks. Regarding FIE, the founder NGO is still the major 
owner with 50% of the firm’s shares and Specialised Funds, mostly belonging to 
foundations representing lottery and church funds (Triodos-Doen and ICCO), holding 
23% of the company.  
Compared to the other two MFIs, the main shareholders of Banco Los Andes 
have less social legitimacy.  In contrast with the NGOs, Development Banks, Bilateral 
Donors, or other Specialised Funds, Procredit Holding is clearly less social-driven.  
Probably this is not a fair comparison.  Procredit Holding is one of the leading 
pioneers developing and forging commercial MFIs around the world, benefiting 
thousands of people, and its methodology and business mentality are probably the main 
contributors to Banco Los Andes’ success. Nevertheless, this thesis seeks to analyse 
which MFIs have stakeholders that are more legitimate, so the conclusion is valid. 
Funding Sources 
A commercial MFI, like any other formal financial institution in Bolivia, can be 
funded by financial organisations such as second tier banks, other national financial 
organisations and international institutions. 
                                                 
217  Bolsa Boliviana de Valores, http://bolsa-valores-bolivia.com/listadeemisores1.htm.  
218  See www.triodos.com, www.procredit-holding.com, www.oikocredit.org.  
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NAFIBO and FONDESIF are the two Bolivian second tier banks. NAFIBO has 
a mixed (public and private) ownership, while FONDESIF is entirely public. Both 
organisations have special funds destined to promote microfinance activities, as part of 
governmental policies aimed at the eradication of poverty.219 
MFIs are also authorised to contract medium- and long-terms loans from other 
Bolivian regulated financial organisations (such as banks, credit unions, other FFPs and 
housing loan “mutuales”) and from international financial organisations.  
Table 13 indicates that Ecofuturo is almost entirely funded by other Bolivian 
financial entities. In contrast, FIE depends more on loans from second tier banks and 
international organisations as their main source of institutional funding, whereas Banco 
Los Andes attracts funds mostly from national and international financial organisations.  
 
 
Table 13. MFIs composition of Funding Sources (Dec. 2004)  
FUNDING SOURCE 
Banco Los 
Andes FIE ECOFUTURO 
Second Tier Banks 13,1% 29,8% 0,0% 
National Organisations 20,1% 17,9% 99,2% 
International Organisations 66,1% 51,0% 0,0% 
Other 0,8% 1,2% 0,8% 
Total 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Source: Superintendecnia de Bancos y Entidades Financieras (2005), Boletín Financiero Diciembre 2004. 
 
Loans from other national financial entities only require the payment of market 
interest rates. MFIs can obtain as many loans as they want from the financial system as 
long as they pay the interest rate offered. Loans from second tier banks and international 
organizations are different. 
In order to be granted a loan from NAFIBO or FONDESIF, with interest rates 
below the market rate, the company must retail the funds obtained to microloans in 
areas prioritised by governmental policies. Second tier banks offer incentives to MFIs to 
serve market niches beyond their traditional clientele (e.g. small street traders in big 
cities). Therefore, the prioritised areas vary from unserved rural peasants to peri-urban 
handcrafters.220  
 In the case of international organisations, normally, the loans also require the 
funds to be used for specific purposes. Most of these entities consist of development 
banks, specialised funds and international financial NGOs. Depending on the 
organisations, some of them prioritise general concerns such as sustainable development 
                                                 
219  See www.fondesfi.gov.bo and www.nafibo.com.bo.  
220  See www.fondesfi.gov.bo and www.nafibo.com.bo.  
 
 
 
 
 56
or economic growth, while others focus more on microfinance activities to fight 
poverty. 
 Graph 4 illustrates the composition of the international funding of Banco Los 
Andes and FIE. (Ecofuturo does not obtain any loans from these organisations). 
Graph 4. FIE and Banco Los Andes’ International Funding Source Composition 
(Dec. 2004)  
45,8%
46,9%
7,4%
61,6%
36,1%
2,3%
FIE Banco Los Andes
Development Banks Specialised Funds International NGOs
 
Source: PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2005), Banco Los Andes Audited Financial Statements 2004, p.7 
             PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2005), FIE Audited Financial Statements 2004, p.6. 
 
Both organisations have more or less the same source of international funding, 
primarily from development banks and specialised funds, with international NGOs only 
having a marginal share.  
 Development banks include the International Finance Corporation of the World 
Bank (IFC) (31% in Banco Los Andes and 20% in FIE) the Andean Development 
Corporation (CAF) (15% in Banco Los Andes and 26% in FIE) and the German 
Development Bank (KfW) (13% in Banco Los Andes).221 
Regarding Specialised Funds, FIE holds larger loans from Blue Orchand 
Microfinance (18%), the Latin American Challenge Investment Fund, LACIF (14%) 
and Triodos-Doen (9%), while the main international creditors of Banco Los Andes are 
the Netherlands’ Financing Society, FMO (15%), the Organization of the Petroleum 
Exporting Countries Fund, OPEC Fund (13%) and the Belgian Investment Company for 
Developing Countries, BIO (8%).222 
                                                 
221  PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2005), Banco Los Andes Audited Financial Statements 2004, p.7 and              
PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2005), FIE Audited Financial Statements 2004, p.6. 
222  Ibid. For profiles of the specialised funds visit www.blueorchad.ch, www.lacif.com, www.triodos.com, 
www.fmo.nl, www.opecfund.org, www.b-i-o.be.  
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According to the information presented, FIE and Banco Los Andes rely more on 
conditional loans below market rates from Specialised Funds, Second Tier and 
Development Banks than Ecofuturo, which is funded mainly by commercial loans from 
Bolivian financial entities. 
After establishing which are the most powerful and legitimate stakeholders in 
the case of each MFI, the following sections discuss the extent to which these 
stakeholders affected the decision of the organisations to engage in CSR. 
4.2.3 Stakeholder Incidence on MFIs 
As part of the interview conducted with top MFIs managers, they were asked to 
give their opinion about the degree of involvement of shareholders and funding sources 
in the decision to undertake CSR. (See Annex B). 
According to the General Manager of Ecofuturo and the Risk Manager of FIE, 
founder NGOs were key activists seeking information and contacting people related to 
the CSR field, nationally and internationally.   
In FIE, the founder NGO is the main promoter of social activities beyond 
microfinance, particularly involving the community, clients and employees. The 
president of the organisation (who participated in the stakeholder focus group) is also 
actively involved in the implementation of CSR and is proud to present the NGO and 
the president of the Board of Directors (representing the founder NGO) as the main 
advocates. 
In Ecofuturo, CSR was also an initiative of the Board of Directors. The General 
Manager referred to the President and Vice-President of the Board as the major 
promoters, both representing founder NGOs. 
The Swiss Cooperation (COSUDE) is a minority shareholder of both Ecofuturo 
and FIE, and is the principal advocate of CSR in microfinance in Bolivia, through its 
project PROFIN. According to both MFIs, PROFIN proposed the implementation of the 
CSR pilot project that the two organisations are currently participating. 
Moreover, as an initiative of Tridos Bank, one of FIE’s main shareholders and 
minor funding source, the organisation will take part in another pilot project aimed to 
implement sustainability reporting. 
Tridos Bank organised and financed a workshop in October 2005 for investee 
microfinance institutions of Triodos-Doen and Hivos-Triodos Fund at the organisation’s 
headquarters in the Netherlands. FIE is one of the six MFIs interested in taking part in 
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the pilot designed to assist commercial MFIs in the implementation of the Global 
Reporting Initiative (GRI) Guidelines from 2006 onwards.223  
According to Banco Los Andes’ National Risk Manager, the main shareholder is 
more focused on the sustainability of the bank and the impact of its microfinance 
activities, but the organisation does not dismiss engaging in social activities beyond 
microfinance in the future. The interviewee argued that Procredit Holding promotes 
activities more related to environmental sustainability. Some other funding sources of 
Banco Los Andes, such as FMO and BIO, also ask more environmental friendly polices 
from the MFI. 
Like any other institution belonging to the Procredit Group, operational activities 
and the screening criteria of loans performed by Banco Los Andes are in strict 
concordance with environmental laws and norms. Banco Los Andes is the only MFI in 
Bolivia with an environmental policy structured within an Environmental Management 
System, including an “exclusion list”, defining activities and economic sectors that 
cannot be financed by the Bank.224 
4.2.4 Main Findings 
Focus groups conducted with the three MFIs included in this case study 
concluded that the organisations prioritise clients, employees, shareholders, funding 
sources and the community as the main stakeholders. 
According to the definition assumed for power as an attribute of stakeholders, 
shareholders and funding sources were found to be the most powerful stakeholders. 
Table 14 describes the social legitimacy of the main stockholders and funding sources 
for each MFI, based on the analysis of their characteristics, ownership and legal status. 
Table 14. Legitimacy Ranking of Shareholders and Funding Sources 
MFI Shareholders Funding Sources 
Ecofuturo 1 3 
FIE 2 1 
Banco Los Andes 3 2 
  Source: Tables 12 and 13 
 
Comparatively, FIE and Ecofuturo have more socially legitimate shareholders, 
while FIE and Banco Los Andes maintain larger loans from more socially legitimate 
funding sources. 
                                                 
223   Other MFIs participants are Acleda Bank in Cambodia, K-Rep Bank in Kenya, Centenary Rural 
Development Bank in Uganda, Banco Solidario in Ecuador and Findesa in Nicaragua. See 
http://www.triodos.com/com/whats_new/latest_news/general/179709?lang=  
224  BANCO LOS ANDES (2005), Memoria Anual, pp. 34-35. 
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In accordance with interviews conducted with the top executives of the MFIs 
and information gathered from secondary sources, MFIs engaging in CSR had been 
influenced significantly by socially legitimate stakeholders, mainly the shareholders, to 
initiate the process of transparent reporting within CSR.  
Ecofuturo had their main advocates in founder NGOs, while FIE also had the 
influence of minor funding sources, which led the organisation to start more than one 
pilot project related to CSR.  
Powerful stakeholders, according to their preferences, influenced Banco Los 
Andes to engage in activities more related to environmental sustainability. 
4.3 CSR Base Line Incidence on CSR Adoption 
The outcome of the pilot project started by FIE and Ecofuturo will be the 
publication of their first structured social balance sheet, in accordance with GRI 
guidelines. Therefore, they do not yet know how they are performing according to CSR 
indicators. 
Nevertheless, there are appraisal tools to help firms to conduct a preliminary 
diagnosis about their CSR performance before undertaking the implementation process 
of socially responsible management practices. 
In order to assess the CSR base line of FIE, Ecofuturo and Banco Los Andes, the 
Ethos CSR Appraisal Tool was chosen as a proxy to determine which firm is likely to 
perform better on a potential social balance sheet, in order to address the question 
whether the MFIs wanting to engage in CSR have an initial competitive advantage.   
The Ethos indicators are an effort of the Ethos Institute aimed at providing 
companies with a tool to support the process of incorporation of CSR in their 
management. The indicators are integrated with relevant initiatives in the field of 
Sustainable Development such as the Global Compact and the Millennium 
Development Goals of the United Nations. The tool was also harmonised taking into 
account common points with other important and strategic tools for CSR reporting: GRI 
(Global Reporting Initiative), Sustainability Reporting Guidelines, SAI (Social 
Accountability International), SA8000 Standard, and Accountability AA1000 
Standard.225  
The assessment questionnaire is divided into seven broad themes: 
• Values, Transparency and Governance 
• Workforce 
                                                 
225   INSTITUTO ETHOS (2005), ETHOS Indicators on Corporate Social Responsibility, p.3.  
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• Environment 
• Suppliers 
• Consumers and Customers 
• Community 
• Government and Society 
These themes are addressed by 224 questions divided into two types of 
indicators. The first type, which can be described as depth indicators, assesses the 
current stage of the company’s management. It comprises 35 indicators showing four 
stages of a certain practice, whose performance level evolves from 1 to 4. Each level 
assumes the fulfilment of the previous one, therefore Stage 4 corresponds to the best 
performance in that practice, and presupposes the company has already reached an 
excellence level in that indicator. In the event none of the boxes corresponds to the 
company’s reality, two other options are available: (a) the firm has not addressed the 
issue before or (b) It is not applicable to the company. 
The second type of indicators includes binary questions (yes/no). Its items 
provide elements for validation and deeper evaluation of the social responsibility stage 
identified by the company in the first indicators. 
The questionnaire is an 80 page document available in three languages free of 
charge at www.ethos.org. A summarised version can be found in Annex F.  
Due to the far-reaching nature of the themes, several areas of the company were 
engaged in the process of filling out the questionnaire. The higher the number of people 
involved in the process and the more diversified the hierarchical levels and the 
departments involved are, the more representative will the answers be and the deeper 
will the internal consideration be, thus ensuring a better self-diagnosis. The MFIs 
agreed that the same persons involved in the stakeholder prioritisation process were the 
appropriate personnel to fill in the form. 
First, each person was asked to fill in the questions separately and a final 
meeting was scheduled to discuss and consolidate the results, assuring a better 
organisational consensus about the indicators.  
Even though this methodology of appraisal tries to acquire results that are as 
accurate and impartial as possible within the constraints of time and resources (and 
though it is the one recommended by the Ethos Institute226), it nonetheless leaves room 
for some information asymmetries between the interviewer and the MFIs. In order 
words, the MFIs can overestimate (or simply lie about) their CSR performance and the 
                                                 
226  INSTITUTO ETHOS (2005), ETHOS Indicators on Corporate Social Responsibility, p.3. 
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interviewer would have no means to know the real information. This situation is 
probable because most of the data required by the indicators are confidential or belong 
more to the institutional culture than to formal documents. 
Nevertheless, as is shown by the findings obtained, most of the information 
gathered from the MFIs could be supported by indirect data in the field, providing more 
validity to the methodology.         
The following section summarises the results in respect of each of the broad 
themes proposed by the Ethos indicators.227  Tables are used to compare the different 
MFIs with regard to these indicators. The proportion of in-depth indicators under stages 
3 and 4 and the proportion of binary indicators with the answer “yes” are taken into 
account to assess which MFI has a better starting point in CSR. Since the binary 
indicators are a complement of the depth indicators, the later will be more conclusive 
for the analysis.  
4.3.1 Values, Transparency and Governance 
Six depth and 31 binary indicators were used to address the performance of the 
MFIs on values, transparency and governance in themes such as “adoption and scope of 
ethical values and principles”, “dissemination of the company’s values and ethical 
principles”, and “organizational structure and governance practices”, among others.  
As table 15 shows, in FIE all 6 depth indicators are situated at stage 2 or beyond. 
The situation is different in Banco Los Andes and Ecofuturo. Either they did not 
consider an issue before, or they have indicators below stage 2, showing a lower CSR 
performance. If the binary indicators are considered, FIE has 18 affirmative answers, 
Banco Los Andes 14 and Ecofuturo 10. This also shows a better performance by FIE. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
227  The assessment questionnaire was executed in all three organizations in October 2005. 
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Table 15. MFIs CSR Base Line: Values, Transparency and Governance 
INDICATORS FIE Ecofuturo 
Banco Los 
Andes 
Depth Indicators 
It was not considered 0 1 1 
Not applicable 0 0 0 
Stage 1 0 3 1 
Stage 2 4 2 1 
Stage 3 2 0 3 
Stage 4 0 0 0 
Binary Indicators 
Yes 18 10 14 
No 12 21 17 
Not applicable 1 0 0 
Source: Annex G 
 
Nevertheless, Banco Los Andes has more depth indicators at stage 3 than the 
other MFIs (one more than FIE and three more than Ecofuturo), indicating that the firm 
went further in addressing some CSR issues.  
For instance, Banco Los Andes is one stage further than FIE regarding the depth 
indicator of relations with competitors, affirming that the company discusses its attitude 
with workers and customers, warning them about fair competition issues, and 
participates in the discussion of these issues in professional associations. FIE reached 
the stage where the firm has explicit and stated rules of unfair competition, but 
discusses its attitude towards competitors only periodically (or when it is necessary), 
with its workforce. 
Therefore, regarding values, transparency and governance, the results are not 
conclusive, since FIE has a larger number of indicators beyond stage 2, and Banco Los 
Andes has more depth indicators at further stages.  
4.3.2 Workforce 
Taking into account the 9 depth indicators used to assess the CSR performance 
on the workforce, table 16 illustrates that Banco Los Andes has reached more advanced 
stages than FIE and Ecofuturo.  
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Table 16. MFIs CSR Base Line: Workforce 
 INDICATOR FIE Ecofuturo 
Banco Los 
Andes 
Depth Indicators 
It was not considered 2 2 1 
Not applicable 2 1 1 
Stage 1 1 3 0 
Stage 2 2 3 3 
Stage 3 2 0 3 
Stage 4 0 0 1 
Binary Indicators 
Yes 14 12 14 
No 33 42 41 
Not app. 12 5 4 
Source: Annex G 
 
Seven out of nine depth indicators of Banco Los Andes fall at stage 2 or higher, 
whereas FIE has only 4 in these categories and Ecofuturo has none. Regarding binary 
indicators, Banco Los Andes and FIE are performing equally, with 14 positive answers. 
Banco Los Andes performs better on themes such as “valuing diversity”, 
“handling of dismissals”, “preparation for retirement” and “participative management”. 
With respect to the latter, the firm believes that it has reached the optimal stage (4), 
where the company incorporates the participation of employee representatives in 
management committees or in strategic decisions, and provides them with the necessary 
training to participate in the development of these processes. This affirmation is based 
on policies carried on by Banco Los Andes during major strategic decisions, such as the 
transformation into a Bank or the relocation of Headquarters from La Paz to Santa Cruz. 
According to the Risk Manager, every major strategic decision is taken only after 
consultation with employees through the operational departments.228   
FIE and Ecofuturo only reached stage 2, where the firms provide employees 
with information about the company and training to enable them to understand and 
analyse such information, but does not integrate them into strategic decisions. 
4.3.3 Environment 
Table 17 shows that Banco Los Andes performs better with respect to 
environmental issues within CSR. 
 
 
                                                 
228  Focus Group conducted to fill the ETHOS indicators. 
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Table 17. MFIs CSR Base Line: Environment 
 INDICATOR FIE Ecofuturo 
Banco Los 
Andes 
Depth Indicators 
It was not considered 1 2 0 
Not applicable 2 1 1 
Stage 1 0 0 0 
Stage 2 0 0 1 
Stage 3 0 0 0 
Stage 4 0 0 1 
Binary Indicators 
Yes 0 0 3 
No 2 6 5 
Not app. 12 8 6 
Source: Annex G 
 
Banco Los Andes is the only MFI in Bolivia with an environmental policy 
structured within an Environmental Management System, including an “exclusion list” 
defining activities and economic sectors that cannot be financed by the Bank. 229 This is 
reflected by the fact that 2 out of 3 depth indicators are beyond stage 2, while FIE and 
Ecofuturo cannot claim that they have reached at least stage 1 with respect to all of 
them. 
Furthermore, Banco Los Andes believes that the firm reached the highest stage 
of the depth indicator measuring the company’s commitment to environmental quality 
improvement, assuring that the bank develops new businesses taking into account, from 
scratch, the principles and opportunities related to environmental sustainability. 
4.3.4 Suppliers 
The supplier’s indicators measured the MFIs’ performance on themes such as 
the criteria for the selection of suppliers and outsourcing companies, and policies 
against child and forced labour in the production chain, among others. Table 18 
indicates that many of the issues proposed by Ethos were not considered before by any 
MFI, particularly not by FIE. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
229  BANCO LOS ANDES (2005), Memoria Anual, pp. 34-35. 
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Table 18. MFIs CSR Base Line: Suppliers 
 INDICATOR FIE Ecofuturo 
Banco Los 
Andes 
Depth Indicators 
It was not considered 4 2 2 
Not applicable 0 0 0 
Stage 1 1 1 2 
Stage 2 0 2 1 
Stage 3 0 0 0 
Stage 4 0 0 0 
Binary Indicators 
Yes 2 6 3 
No 17 13 16 
Not app. 0 0 0 
Source: Annex G 
 
Analysing depth and binary indicators, Ecofuturo performs slightly better than 
Banco Los Andes, with one more indicator in stage 2 and 3 more “yes” answers about 
binary indicators, whereas FIE reached only stage 1 and has 4 less affirmative binary 
indicators than Ecofuturo.  
4.3.5 Consumers and Customers 
As table 19 illustrates, regarding CSR performance on managing consumers and 
customers, Banco Los Andes has reached stages 3 and 4 in 2 of the 3 depth indicators 
proposed by Ethos, while FIE has only come up to stage 3 and Ecofuturo up to stage 2. 
Concerning binary indicators, FIE and Banco Los Andes scored 16 affirmative 
questions and Ecofuturo scored 10. 
Table 19.  
Table 20. MFIs CSR Base Line: Consumers and Customers 
 INDICATOR FIE Ecofuturo
Banco Los 
Andes 
Depth Indicators 
It was not considered 1 0 0 
Not applicable 0 0 0 
Stage 1 0 2 1 
Stage 2 1 1 0 
Stage 3 1 0 1 
Stage 4 0 0 1 
Binary Indicators 
Yes 16 10 16 
No 9 15 9 
Not app. 1 1 1 
Source: Annex G 
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Ethos indicators about customers and consumers measure issues such as “the 
firm’s business communication influence on the building of an image of credibility and 
trust”, its “commitment to customers/consumers service quality” and its “knowledge 
and management of potential damage caused by its products and services”.  
With regard to this issue, Banco Los Andes claims that it has reached the highest 
level of performance, implying that the firm carries out research and works together 
with suppliers and distributors, consumers, competitors and government, aiming to 
improve products and services continuously. The General Manager of Banco Los Andes 
is the Chairman of the Association of Financial Organizations Specialised in Micro 
Finances of Bolivia (ASOFIN), and the Bank is the main promoter of joint research, the 
exchange of information amongst MFIs and the improvement of the service quality to 
clients of the microfinance industry as a whole.230   
4.3.6 The Community 
Regarding the community, Ethos indicators try to measure the CSR performance 
of firms on issues such as the management of the company’s impact on the surrounding 
community, relations with local organizations, social action funding and the company’s 
engagement in social action. Table 20 indicates that Ecofuturo did not consider these 
issues before, while FIE reached stage 2 in one depth indicator and Banco Los Andes 
reached the same stage twice. 
 
Table 21. MFIs CSR Base Line: Community 
 INDICATOR FIE Ecofuturo 
Banco Los 
Andes 
Depth Indicators 
It was not considered 1 4 0 
Not applicable 0 0 0 
Stage 1 2 0 2 
Stage 2 1 0 2 
Stage 3 0 0 0 
Stage 4 0 0 0 
Binary Indicators 
Yes 0 0 8 
No 22 22 14 
Not app. 0 0 0 
Source: Annex G 
 
                                                 
230   See www.asofinbolivia.com.  
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Banco Los Andes performed better that the other MFIs with respect to the 
community indicators since the Bank claims that (with respect to the company’s 
engagement in social action), in addition to donations and/or corporate social projects, 
the firm makes available some of its employees’ working hours or equipment for 
activities connected with these projects. Banco Los Andes not only donated funds for 
parks, hospitals and school restoration in communities of cities such as Sucre and Santa 
Cruz and worked together with the Municipality of La Paz to restore garbage cans in the 
city, but also gave incentives to its workers to participate in those projects or donate 
funds as well. FIE reached one stage lower, since it donates funds to different social 
projects, but does not encourage its workers to contribute to the projects.231  
Regarding binary indicators, Banco Los Andes had 8 affirmative responses, 
whereas FIE and Ecofuturo had none. 
4.3.7 Government and Society 
As table 21 shows, Banco Los Andes reached further stages regarding depth 
indicators than Ecofuturo and FIE regarding Government and Society. The bank 
believes that one indicator falls at stage 4 and 2 at stage 2, while FIE only reached stage 
1 and Ecofuturo stage 2. 
 
Table 22. MFIs CSR Base Line: Government and Society 
 INDICATOR FIE Ecofuturo 
Banco Los 
Andes 
Depth Indicators 
It was not considered 0 1 0 
Not applicable 2 1 1 
Stage 1 2 1 0 
Stage 2 0 1 2 
Stage 3 0 0 0 
Stage 4 0 0 1 
Binary Indicators 
Yes 0 1 5 
No 6 8 4 
Not app. 6 3 3 
Source: Annex G 
 
Considering binary indicators, Banco Los Andes had more positive answers (5) 
than the other two MFIs (zero FIE and 1 Ecofuturo). 
                                                 
231   Focus Groups conducted to fill the ETHOS indicators. 
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Regarding this particular theme, Ethos indicators measure policies against 
donations to political campaigns, the companies’ construction of citizenship, and anti-
corruption and bribery practices.  With regard to the latter, Banco Los Andes has 
reached the highest stage, whereas FIE believed it was not applicable and Ecofuturo had 
not considered the issue before. 
4.3.8 Main Findings 
Taking into account the seven broad themes described in preceding sections, it 
can be concluded that Banco Los Andes performs better than FIE and Ecofuturo 
according to Ethos indicators of CSR. Table 22 ranks the performance of each MFI 
according to the data of tables 15 to 21 and indicates that Banco Los Andes performed 
equal or better than the other two MFIs except  in respect of one theme, suppliers. 
Table 23. CSR Base Line, Summary (1 to 3, 1 being the highest) 
CSR Theme FIE Ecofuturo Banco Los Andes 
Values, Transparency and Governance 1 2 1 
Workforce 2 3 1 
Environment 2 2 1 
Suppliers 3 1 2 
Customers and Consumers 2 3 1 
Community 2 3 1 
Government and Society 3 2 1 
   Source: Tables 15 to 21 
 
This finding indicates that the MFI not undertaking CSR has a better initial 
position in respect of CSR than the two firms participating in the CSR pilot project, 
according to Ethos’ CSR standards.
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS, SCOPE, SHORTCOMINGS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
The following paragraphs discuss the main conclusions of the thesis, testing the 
hypotheses proposed against the findings encountered during the field research. This is 
followed by recommendations to encourage further research on the subject and 
proposals with regard to potential changes in policy in the development field. 
In general, it can be argued that there are two main reasons for commercial MFIs 
to engage in CSR: (a) instrumental (strategic) potential benefits to gain competitive 
advantage to overcome increasing competition and saturation of the market; and (b) 
pressure from influential (powerful) social stakeholders, mainly from the ones providing 
funds (shareholders and funding sources). 
These reasons are more crucial than a potential initial advantage over 
competitors. It can be argued that the MFIs did not evaluate their internal competitive 
advantages before engaging in CSR, even though it could be fundamental once the 
social balance sheet is published. In other words, undertaking CSR will not be of much 
use if the formal results show that the firm is less socially responsible or aware than its 
competitors.  On the other hand, if a firm is behind in respect of CSR indicators, this 
may be a strong argument for engaging in CSR activities. 
 
 
5.1 Conclusions 
5.1.1 The Incidence of Competition on CSR Adoption 
The first hypothesis considered that increasing competition led less well-
positioned MFIs to undertake CSR for strategic (instrumental) reasons.  Variables 
within the hypothesis were assumed as: 
 Independent Variables Dependent Variables 
H 1: V1: Competition and market positioning V2: View or approach to CSR 
 
With the information gathered, it can be concluded that the hypothesis proposed 
cannot be rejected. Increasing competition in the Bolivian microfinance industry is 
pushing MFIs to acquire competitive advantages. Within this framework, less well-
positioned MFIs see in CSR a strategic concept to gain market share in order to compete 
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with market leaders, while leading firms still do not acknowledge CSR as relevant. 
Consequently, the adoption of CSR is strategic and not normative, being consistent with 
the instrumental view of stakeholder theory.  
5.1.2 Stakeholders Incidence on CSR Adoption 
The second hypothesis proposed took into account the descriptive view of 
stakeholder theory and affirmed that CSR was adopted by those MFIs whose powerful 
stakeholders have relatively more social legitimacy. Variables were proposed as 
follows: 
 Independent Variables Dependent Variables 
H 2: V4: Attributes of stakeholders V3: Adoption of CSR 
 
The findings did not present sufficient empirical evidence to reject hypothesis 2, 
indicating that powerful and legitimate stakeholders influenced FIE and Ecofuturo to 
engage in CSR. The stakeholders also had an influence on Banco Los Andes, but they 
led the firm to focus more on environmental issues rather than on CSR. 
5.1.3 CSR Base Line and CSR Adoption 
The third hypothesis postulates that CSR was adopted by those MFIs who are 
already performing better according to CSR standards, having a better initial internal 
competitive advantage. The variables proposed were: 
 Independent Variables Dependent Variables 
H 3: V5: CSR performance  V3: Adoption of CSR 
 
Taking into account the seven broad themes proposed by the Ethos indicators, 
the data analysis conducted indicates that Banco Los Andes performs better than FIE 
and Ecofuturo according to CSR standards. This finding indicates that there is enough 
empirical evidence to reject hypothesis 3, suggesting that FIE and Ecofuturo did not 
engage in CSR because of an initial competitive advantage. 
5.2 Scope and Shortcomings 
The present thesis is methodologically based on a case study, therefore its 
findings should be generalised carefully. Commercial MFIs in Bolivia represent small 
financial firms operating in a developing country, but the conclusions deduced from 
their approach towards CSR should be cautiously studied prior to any generalisations to 
other firms with similar characteristics. 
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5.3 Recommendations  
The pilot project started by FIE and Ecofuturo will end with the publication of 
their first structured social balance sheet.  This thesis only discussed why these 
organisations were embarking on CSR. Therefore, the next logical step is to consider 
whether the firms’ expectations about the potential strategic benefits of CSR were 
realised. 
Research should be conducted after a prudent period of CSR implementation, 
assessing whether a competitive advantage and better positioning in the market (through 
image improvement and differentiation) were accomplished by Ecofuturo and FIE.  
Previous studies have shown the potential benefits of CSR adoption by firms in 
the South.232 Nevertheless, expanding the research of this thesis to also consider this 
question would provide a bigger picture of the “business case” for CSR, and whether 
expectations are indeed realised. 
Moreover, the benefits achieved should be compared with other companies 
undertaking CSR in order to analyse whether CSR is more valuable to certain firms. 
The reasoning behind this is that trustworthiness, honesty, and integrity are difficult to 
fake. Consequently, MFIs could be an excellent case study to address whether CSR is 
more instrumental (practical) for firms already considered to be social than for 
companies under more public scrutiny such as oil companies or even normal banking 
institutions. 
Regarding development policies, the findings of the present thesis could be a 
motivation for organisations (public or donors) wanting to promote CSR in the South. 
Development organisations could seek competitive markets and promote the strategic 
benefits of CSR or assess the feasibility of giving incentives to firms in these markets in 
order to induce them to start CSR.  
Nonetheless, the outcome of the present thesis will only assure them that firms 
could be interested in CSR, not if CSR will be of real value to the firms. Development 
organisations would have to rely on other studies to confirm that CSR has real strategic 
value to companies. 
 
 
                                                 
232  An IFC study published in 2002 highlights the benefits in CSR adoption by 240 firms from Africa, Asia, 
Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe. IFC, SustainAbility, ETHOS (2004), Developing Value: The 
business case for sustainability in emerging markets, pp. 4 -64. 
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ANNEX A: Commercial MFIs’ Institutional Profile233 
BancoSol 
Name Banco Solidario S.A. 
Logo 
 
Incorporation Date December 11, 1991 
Starting 
Operations Date 
February 10, 1992 
Mission We are the bank that provides opportunities to low income 
sectors for a better future through access to high quality, 
integrated financial services. 
Target Group Urban and rural micro and small enterprise 
Number of 
Branches 
40 
Number of 
Employees 
664 
Brief Profile In 1984, a group of Bolivian businessmen linked to the micro-
entrepreneurial sector in the country requested Accion 
Internacional of the United States, to consider the opportunity to 
create a non-profit institution that could support the development 
of microenterprises in Bolivia. Among other things, the study 
concluded that lack of access to credit through the formal 
financial system was the major limiting factor for the growth of 
microenterprises.  
From that perspective, on November 17, 1986, international and 
Bolivian investors made possible the initiation of credit 
intermediation activities with the public through the Promoción 
para el Desarrollo de la Microempresa (Prodem), structured as an 
(NGO). 
 
This new entity started to grant small loans for working capital to 
groups of three or more persons involved in similar activities, 
which got together to formally guarantee each other in order to 
comply with the responsibilities acquired under the Solidarity 
                                                 
233  Extracted from http://www.microfinanzasbolivia.com, http://www.asofinbolivia.com, and 
http://www.finrural-bo.org.  
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Name Banco Solidario S.A. 
Credit methodology. 
In January 1992, the NGO had 17.000 clients with a credit 
portfolio that amounted to 4 million US Dollars, distributed in 4 
branches located in the cities of La Paz, El Alto, Cochabamba 
and Santa Cruz.  
Until that time the positive development of the NGO and the 
great unsatisfied demand for financial services were the main 
reasons that prompted the Board of Directors to expand the 
activities to satisfy the demand for credit in the growing 
microenterprise sector. 
 
The most promising alternative and the most feasible instrument 
to reach their objectives and to overcome the limitations 
resulting from the financial and legal structure of the Non-
Governmental Organization was the creation in 1992 of a 
commercial bank thereafter, called Banco Solidario S.A. 
(BancoSol S.A.) 
 
After more than a decade of activities, BancoSol has disbursed 
more than 1.300 million US Dollars, financing more than 
1.350.000 projects for microenterepreneurs. 
Relevant Facts In 2004 BancoSol were rated as the BEST BANK OF BOLIVIA 
in accordance with the CAMEL analysis undertaken by the 
Nueva Economía Weekly publication. During eight consecutive 
years the organization was among the two best banks in the 
country, according to this analysis. 
 
For the fifth consecutive year, Fitch Ratings, the international 
rating firm, rated BancoSol with an A+. 
 
Banco Los Andes  
Name Banco Los Andes Procredit S.A. 
Logo 
 
Incorporation 
Date 
June 29, 1995 
Starting 
Operations Date 
July 10, 1995 
Mission Grant financial services of excellence to micro, small and 
medium enterprises, contributing to the socio-economic 
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Name Banco Los Andes Procredit S.A. 
development of Bolivia 
 
Develop a responsible and ethical relationship with our 
clients and employees 
 
Our commitment with the country is permanent, seeking 
reasonable profitability that will allow us to be sustainable in 
the long term 
Target Group Urban and rural, micro, small and medium enterprises 
Number of 
Branches 
37 
Number of 
Employees 
840 
 Brief Profile From the outset in 1995, Caja Los Andes consolidated its 
position as one of the most successful institutions in the 
Bolivian financial market. The sustained growthregistered 
throughout its institutional life is in contrast with the results 
of the national financial system; enabling it to fully comply 
with its mission, consistent in “contributing to the socio-
economic development of the population with lower 
resources, supporting the development of the micro, small 
and medium enterprise and the improvement of the quality of 
life of their families.”  
 
Los Andes has become an example of innovation in financial 
technologies adapted to the segments of the population 
ignored by the traditional banking system. These efforts have 
gained recognition at the national and the international level. 
An example of this is the Award of Excellence in 
Microfinance granted by the Interamerican Development 
Bank (IDB) for its performance in Latin America in the year 
2000. 
 
Caja Los Andes started its activities in 1995 based on the 
portfolio, activities and credit technology of the Asociación 
ProCredito, the founder and main stockholder of Caja Los 
Andes at that time. Caja Los Andes applied an entrepreneurial 
policy with a long term vision that enabled it to reach its 
objectives in the social sphere with sound economic and 
financial development. 
 
When Caja Los Andes became regulated/ supervised it was 
able to include credit services and deposits from the public, 
adapted to the characteristics of its target population. The 
institution was guided by the vision to “Grow as an institution 
that provides dynamic, timely, integral and efficient financial 
services to its clients, within a framework of sustainability 
that will guarantee its sound permanence in time”. Caja Los 
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Name Banco Los Andes Procredit S.A. 
Andes was able to face difficulties in times of crisis, making 
the best of its competitive advantages and combining them 
with a strategy that transcended prudence in its operations. Its 
institutional performance contrasts with the evolution of the 
national financial system and has enabled Banco Los Andes 
ProCredit to be at the vanguard in a market characterized for 
its high level of competition, considered as the most 
developed and competitive microfinance market in Latin 
America. 
 Relevant Facts To date, with a credit portfolio of more than 126 million 
Dollars and 71.000 clients, Los Andes takes pride in being 
first in portfolio volume among all the microfinance entities 
in the country, and second in deposits from the public, with 
96 million Dollars distributed in 95.000 deposit accounts, 
mainly from the lower income stratum of the population.  
 
The levels of the portfolio quality improvement are superior 
to the average in the financial system, reaching a default rate 
of 2.4% as a consequence of strict prudent policies that enable 
Los Andes to project growth in business volume which will 
be even more significant in the future, always maintaining 
optimum levels of financial self-sustainability.  
 
Starting in January 2005, Los Andes began operating as 
Banco Los Andes ProCredit, has complying with all legal 
procedures set forth by the Superintendence of Banks and 
Financial Entities, with equity of approximately 15 million 
Dollars. 
The Bank is part of the ProCredit Group, a network of 
financial institutions that currently has 18 members in Eastern 
Europe, Latin America and Africa. These institutions, whose 
major stockholder is ProCredit Holding AG (legally 
incorporated, with head office in Germany) promote financial 
services for the lower income population aimed to provide 
socio-economic development, prioritizing the financing of 
small and medium enterprises thus covering an important gap 
in the financial market. 
Throughout the years, the Group has developed a profound 
level of understanding in connection with the problems of the 
micro and small enterprises, as well as their opportunities and 
their importance by developing integrated financial services 
adapted to these sectors.  
The major shareholders of ProCredit Holding AG are 
international institutions, i.e. IFC (of the World Bank) KFW 
and DEG (of the German Government), FMO (of the Dutch 
Government) and BIO (of the Belgian Government), and 
private institutions such as IPC and IPC-Invest (Germany), 
Doën Foundation (Holland) ProCredit Assotiation (Bolivia), 
Fundasal Foundation (El Salvador), among others. 
All the above-mentioned are institutions committed to 
contribute to the improvement of the living conditions of low 
income populations in developing countries. The group of 
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Name Banco Los Andes Procredit S.A. 
shareholders, with their support to the consolidation of Banco 
Los Andes ProCredit, generates stability and economic 
growth encompassing social impact for the benefit of the 
majority sectors of the population. 
 
Ecofuturo FFP 
Name Fondo Financiero Privado EcoFuturo S.A. 
Logo 
 
Incorporation 
Date 
August 3, 1998 
Starting 
Operations Date 
June 1, 1999 
Mission To become a competitive, efficient and sustainable financial 
entity supporting the development of the small and 
microenterprise in rural and urban areas, providing 
innovative services adapted to the needs of its clients. 
Target Group Urban and rural microenterprise 
Number of 
Branches 
8 
Number of 
Employees 
113 
Brief Profile EcoFuturo was created by a group of NGOs (ANED, 
FADES, IDEPRO and UNITAS), jointly with a group of 
businessmen and with the assistance of some international 
cooperation agencies. After facing some difficulties in its 
first years of operations, as a Private Financial Fund, 
EcoFuturo has favorably evolved and is reaching its 
consolidation as one of the important players in the Bolivian 
microfinance spectrum. 
 
FIE FFP 
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Name Fondo Financiero Privado para el Fomento a las Iniciativas 
Económicas S.A. 
Logo 
 
Incorporation 
Date 
February 17, 1998 
Starting 
Operations Date 
March 16, 1998 
Mission FFP FIE S.A. institutional mission has not changed since its 
inception. From the social point of view its activities are 
cantered within the low income sectors, recognized by FIE as 
one of the important economic agents for the development of 
the country. FIE seeks to obtain reasonable profitability for 
its shareholders through transparent practices from the 
entrepreneurial point of view and to develop equitable 
conditions designed for the democratization of the economy. 
Target Group Urban micro and small enterprise 
Number of 
Branches 
78 
Number of 
Employees 
551 
Brief Profile The history of FIE started in mid-1984 in a social agency 
serving political refugees in La Paz, Bolivia. It is in this 
social endeavor where five professional women proposed to 
create services for clients facing difficult situations due to 
lack of employment, income and others that would help FIE 
to overcome the traditional practices of grants and subsidies. 
 
The daily contact with the diverse impoverished sectors 
forced them to question the causes of such impoverishment 
as well as the traditional interventions seeking to “mitigate” 
poverty. In the course of these questions, micro credit 
experiences from other parts of the world became news, 
specifically the experience of SEWA in India, Grameen Bank 
in Bangladesh and Accion in the Dominican Republic. 
 
Prodem FFP 
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 Name Fondo Financiero Privado para la Promoción y Desarrollo de 
la Microempresa S.A. 
Logo 
 
Incorporation 
Date 
August 18, 1998 
Starting 
Operations Date 
January 3, 2000 
Mission To provide state-of-the-art financial products and services of 
excellence to satisfy the long-lasting needs of our urban and 
rural clients, supporting the country’s development with 
highly qualified staff committed with a concept of quality, 
change, innovation, efficiency and profitability. 
Target Group Rural and urban, micro, small, and medium enterprise 
Number of 
Branches 
79 
Number of 
Employees 
610 
Brief Profile Prodem was incorporated in 1986 as a non-profit 
organization, with the vision to introduce microfinance 
services in Bolivia’s urban and rural areas. In 1992, Prodem 
created BancoSol, the first bank in the world specialized in 
providing financial services to micro and small entrepreneurs. 
In 1988, Prodem managed a portfolio of over 24 million US 
Dollars distributed among 47 thousand clients, and a network 
of national branches. Later, Prodem realized that it was 
necessary to deeply penetrate into the rural area as a regulated 
/ supervised entity. Thus, the Fondo Financiero Privado 
Prodem was founded. This step forward resulted in the largest 
network of rural branches in the country. 
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ANNEX B: Model for the Interview to Key Personnel of MFIs 
 
Personnel Interviewed: 
Banco Los Andes 
Procredit 
Omar Medrano 
National Risk Manager 
23.10.2005 
FFP Ecofuturo Rodolfo Medrano 
General Manager 
25.10.2005 
FFP FIE Elizabeth Nava 
Risk Manager 
14.10.2005 
 
Questionnaire: 
1. How did the MFI find out about CSR? 
2. Who have been the main promoters (internal and external to the MFI) to 
undertake CSR? 
3. Since when had the MFI planed to engage in CSR? 
4. Which effects do you think CSR will have on: 
a. Clients 
b. Employees 
c. Shareholders 
d. Funding Resources 
e. Suppliers 
f. Superintendence of Banks 
5. In your opinion how much did the following reasons influenced the MFI to start 
CSR (5=very important, 1= no important). Please comment why. 
 
Improve the relationship with main stakeholders  
Improve the organizational image in order to attract more 
clients 
 
Access to Social Responsible Investors  
Increase employees’ productivity  
Improve the MFI’s social impact on the community, 
particularly non-clients. 
 
Improve the environmental management of the 
organization 
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DO the right thing, regardless of the benefits, because it is 
coherent with the original mission 
 
Document the non-financial social activities that the 
institution already perform 
 
Improve the institution’s financial performance  
 
6. Which sentence reflects better the core motive that drove the MFI to engage in 
CSR: 
a. CSR is likely to improve the firm’s social impact beyond microfinance 
and –at the same time- positively affect the MFI’s financial performance, 
product differentiation from competitors and relationship with main 
stakeholders. Therefore, it is part of the strategic management of the 
firm. 
b. The MFI must improve its social impact on the community, regardless 
potential benefits and costs produced by its implementation, given that it 
is coherent with the mission/vision and nature of the MFI.  
7. How would you judge the social legitimacy of the MFI’s main shareholders? 
Here, for each MFI, the main shareholders are listed with a small description 
about their profile 
Shareholder 1  
Shareholder 2  
Shareholder 3  
Shareholder 4  
 
8. In your opinion how involved were the main shareholders in the decision to 
engage in CSR. How involved are in its implementation (5=very much, 1= not at 
all). Please comment why. 
 Engagement Implementation 
Shareholder 1   
Shareholder 2   
Shareholder 3   
Shareholder 4   
 
9. How would you judge the social legitimacy of the MFI’s main funding sources? 
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Here, for each MFI, the main funding sources are listed with a small description 
about their profile 
Funding source 1  
Funding source 2  
Funding source 3  
Funding source 4  
 
10. In your opinion how involved were the main funding providers in the decision to 
engage in CSR. How involved are in its implementation (5=very much, 1= not at 
all). Please comment why. 
 Engagement Implementation 
Funding source 1   
Funding source 2   
Funding source 3   
Funding source 4   
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ANNEX C: Stakeholders Identification and Prioritisation, Results 
Focus Groups 
Ecofuturo FFP 
Date: August 26th 2005 
Participants: 
  Position
1. Rodolfo Medrano General Manager 
2. Armando Farfán Responsible of Planning 
3. José Osinaga National Risk Manager 
4. Mariana Claure  Responsible for Human Resources 
5. Rodrigo Recke Intern 
 
Matrix 1: Stakeholders Identification 
Stakeholder Stakeholder’s interests in the MFI Relevance* 
Employees Stability, good work environment, loyalty 3+3+3+3+3 
Clients Good services, good quality products 3+3+3+3+3 
Community 
Infrastructure, development, outreach, 
donations 
3+3+2 
Government Taxes, supervision, regulation, impact 3+3+2+1 
Shareholders Profits and impact 3+3+3+3 
International Cooperation Impact 3+3+2 
Suppliers Increase business 2+2+2 
Funding Sources Profits and Impact 2+2+3 
*Where: (1) low; (2) medium; (3) high. Each number represents the identification of 
the stakeholder by a participant and the relevance assigned. 
 
Matrix 2: Stakeholders Prioritisation 
Stakeholder 
Image and 
Reputation 
Improvement* 
Increase in 
number of 
clients* 
Better access 
to funding* 
Better 
relationship 
with the 
community* 
personnel’s 
motivation 
improvement* 
SUM 
Clients 3 3 3 3 2 14
Employees 2 3 1 3 3 12 
Funding Sources 3 2 3 1 1 10 
Shareholders 3 2 3 1 1 10 
Community 3 1 2 3 1 10 
Government 3 2 1 2 1 9
Int. Cooperation 3 1 2 1 1 8 
Suppliers 2 1 1 1 1 6 
*Where: (1) low impact; (2) medium impact; (3) high impact.  
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FIE FFP 
Date: August 25th 2005 
Participants: 
 Position
1. Elizabeth Nava  Risk Manager 
2. Federico Ruck  Vice-President of the Board of Directors  
3. Ximena Behoteguy Internal Auditing 
4. Maria Victoria Rojas  President of NGO FIE (Main Shareholder) 
5. Noelia Romao  Responsible for New Projects 
 
Matrix 1: Stakeholders Identification 
Stakeholder Stakeholder’s interests in the MFI Relevance* 
Employees Stability, good work environment, loyalty 3+3+3+3+3 
Clients Good Services, good quality products 3+3+3+3+3 
Community 
Infrastructure, development, outreach, 
donations 
2+2+1+2+2 
Government Taxes, supervision, regulation 3+3+3 
Shareholders Profits and impact 3+2+3+3+3 
Directors Profits and impact 3 
Suppliers Increase business 1+2+2+2 
Funding Sources Profits and impact 2 
*Where: (1) low; (2) medium; (3) high. Each number represents the identification of 
the stakeholder by a participant and the relevance assigned. 
 
Matrix 2: Stakeholders Prioritisation 
Stakeholder 
Image and 
Reputation 
Improvement* 
Increase in 
number of 
clients* 
Better access 
to funding* 
Better 
relationship 
with the 
community* 
personnel’s 
motivation 
improvement * 
SUM 
Employees 2 3 1 2 3 11
Clients 3 3 1 1 2 10 
Shareholders 2 2 3 1 2 10 
Funding Sources 3 2 3 1 1 10 
Community 3 1 1 3 1 9
Government 2 2 3 1 1 9
Directors 3 2 2 1 1 9 
Suppliers 2 1 1 1 1 6 
*Where: (1) low impact; (2) medium impact; (3) high impact.  
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Banco Los Andes Procredit 
Date: October 19th 2005 
Participants: 
 Position 
1. Omar Medrano  National Risk Manager 
2. Waldo Claros  Manager’s Office Asisstance 
3. Frida Luna National Microcredit Sub-Manager 
 
Matrix 1: Stakeholders Identification 
Stakeholder Stakeholder’s interests in the MFI Relevance* 
Shareholders Sustainability 3+3 
Clients Access to quality services 3+3+3 
Directors Accomplish institutional goals 2+2+3 
Superintendence of Banks Supervision, regulation 3+3+3 
Funding Sources Profits and Impact 3+2+3 
Employees Security and good work environment 3+3+3 
Microfinance Network Harmonise policies and promote equilibrium 2+2 
Community Donations and impact 2+3 
*Where: (1) low; (2) medium; (3) high. Each number represents the identification of 
the stakeholder by a participant and the relevance assigned. 
 
Matrix 2: Stakeholders Prioritisation 
Stakeholder 
Image and 
Reputation 
Improvement* 
Increase in 
number of 
clients* 
Better access 
to funding* 
Better 
relationship 
with the 
community* 
personnel’s 
motivation 
improvement * 
SUM 
Shareholders 3 3 3 3 3 15 
Clients 3 3 3 3 3 15
Employees 3 3 2 3 3 14 
Funding Sources 3 2 3 1 1 10 
Community 3 1 1 3 1 9 
Superintendence 
of Banks 
2 2 3 1 1 9 
Directors 3 2 2 1 1 9 
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Community 2 1 1 3 1 8 
*Where: (1) low impact; (2) medium impact; (3) high impact.  
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ANNEX D: Ethos Indicators, Summary of Questions 
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ANNEX E: Ethos Indicators, Data Base 
Nro. FIE ECOFUTURO BANCO LOS ANDES 
100 Stage 3 Stage 1 Stage 3 
101 Yes No Yes 
102 Yes Yes No 
103 Yes No Yes 
104 Yes No Yes 
105 Yes No Yes 
106 Yes Yes Yes 
107 Yes Yes Yes 
108 Yes Yes No 
109 Yes Yes Yes 
200 Stage 2 Stage 1 Stage 2 
201 Yes Yes Yes 
202 No No No 
202 No No Yes 
203 No No No 
204 Yes Yes Yes 
300 Stage 3 Stage 2 Stage 3 
301 Yes No Yes 
302 Yes Yes No 
400 Stage 2 Stage 1 Stage 1 
401 Yes No Yes 
402 Yes Yes No 
403 No No No 
404 Not app. No No 
500 Stage 2 Stage 2 Stage 3 
501 No No No 
502 Yes No No 
600 Stage 2 It was not considered It was not considered 
601 No No Yes 
602 Yes Yes Yes 
603 No No No 
604 No No No 
605 No No No 
606 No No No 
607 Yes No No 
608 No No No 
609 No No No 
700 Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
701 Not app. Not app. Not app. 
702 Not app. Not app. Not app. 
703 Not app. Not app. Not app. 
704 Not app. Not app. Not app. 
800 Stage 2 Stage 2 Stage 4 
801 Not app. Not app. No 
802 No No Yes 
803 Yes No Yes 
900 Stage 1 Stage 1 Stage 2 
901 Yes No No 
902 Yes No No 
903 Yes Yes Yes 
1000 Stage 2 Stage 1 Stage 3 
1001 Yes No Yes 
1002 No No No 
1003 No Yes No 
1004 Yes Yes Yes 
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Nro. FIE ECOFUTURO BANCO LOS ANDES 
1005 No No No 
1006 No No Yes 
1007 No No No 
1008 No No No 
1009 No No No 
1010 No No No 
1011 Yes Yes Yes 
1012 No No No 
1013 No No No 
1014 No No No 
1100 Stage 3 Stage 2 Stage 3 
1101 No Yes No 
1102 Yes No No 
1103 Yes No No 
1104 No No Yes 
1105 No No No 
1106 No No No 
1107 No No No 
1108 Yes Yes Yes 
1109 Yes No Yes 
1110 Not app. No No 
1111 No No No 
1112 Yes No No 
1200 It was not considered It was not considered It was not considered 
1201 No No No 
1202 No No No 
1203 No No No 
1204 No No No 
1205 No No No 
1206 No No Yes 
1207 No No No 
1208 No No No 
1209 No No No 
1210 No Yes No 
1300 Stage 3 Stage 2 Stage 3 
1301 Not app. No No 
1302 Yes No No 
1303 No No No 
1304 Yes Yes Yes 
1400 Not applicable It was not considered Stage 2 
1401 Not app. Yes Yes 
1402 Not app. No No 
1403 Not app. Yes Yes 
1404 Not app. Yes No 
1405 Not app. Yes No 
1500 It was not considered Stage 1 Stage 2 
1501 No No No 
1502 No No No 
1503 No No No 
1504 No No No 
1600 Not applicable It was not considered Stage 4 
1601 Not app. No Yes 
1602 Not app. No No 
1603 Not app. No No 
1604 Not app. Not app. Yes 
1605 Not app. No Yes 
1606 Not app. Not app. No 
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Nro. FIE ECOFUTURO BANCO LOS ANDES 
1700 It was not considered It was not considered Stage 2 
1701 No No No 
1702 No No No 
1800 Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
1801 Not app. Not app. Not app. 
1802 Not app. Not app. Not app. 
1803 Not app. Not app. Not app. 
1804 Not app. Not app. Not app. 
1805 Not app. Not app. Not app. 
1806 Not app. Not app. Not app. 
1900 Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
1901 Not app. Not app. Not app. 
1902 Not app. Not app. Not app. 
1903 Not app. Not app. Not app. 
1904 Not app. Not app. Not app. 
1905 Not app. Not app. Not app. 
1906 Not app. Not app. Not app. 
2000 It was not considered Stage 2 Stage 1 
2001 Yes Yes Yes 
2002 No No No 
2003 No No No 
2004 No No No 
2005 No No No 
2006 No No No 
2007 No Yes Yes 
2100 It was not considered It was not considered It was not considered 
2110 No No No 
2200 It was not considered It was not considered It was not considered 
2201 No No No 
2300 It was not considered Stage 2 Stage 2 
2301 No Yes No 
2302 No Yes Yes 
2303 No Yes No 
2400 Stage 1 Stage 1 Stage 1 
2401 Yes Yes No 
2402 No No No 
2403 No No No 
2404 No No No 
2405 No No No 
2406 No No No 
2407 No No No 
2500 Stage 2 Stage 1 Stage 3 
2501 Yes Yes Yes 
2502 Yes No Yes 
2503 No No No 
2504 Yes No Yes 
2505 Yes No No 
2506 No No No 
2507 No No No 
2508 Yes No Yes 
2600 Stage 3 Stage 2 Stage 4 
2601 No No No 
2602 Yes Yes Yes 
2603 Yes No Yes 
2604 Yes No Yes 
2605 Yes Yes Yes 
2606 No No Yes 
 
 
 
 
 x
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2607 Yes Yes Yes 
2700 It was not considered Stage 1 Stage 1 
2701 No No No 
2702 No No No 
2703 No No No 
2704 No No No 
2705 Not app. Not app. Not app. 
2706 Yes Yes Yes 
2707 Yes Yes Yes 
2708 Yes Yes Yes 
2709 Yes Yes Yes 
2710 Yes Yes Yes 
2711 Yes Yes Yes 
2800 It was not considered It was not considered Stage 1 
2801 No No Yes 
2802 No No No 
2803 No No Yes 
2804 No No No 
2805 No No No 
2806 No No Yes 
2807 No No No 
2808 No No Yes 
2809 No No No 
2810 No No No 
2900 Stage 2 It was not considered Stage 2 
2901 No No Yes 
2902 No No Yes 
3000 Stage 1 It was not considered Stage 1 
3001 No No No 
3002 No No No 
3003 No No No 
3004 No No No 
3005 No No No 
3100 Stage 1 It was not considered Stage 2 
3101 No No No 
3102 No No No 
3103 No No Yes 
3104 No No Yes 
3105 No No No 
3200 Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
3201 Not app. Not app. Not app. 
3202 Not app. Not app. Not app. 
3203 Not app. Not app. Not app. 
3300 Not applicable It was not considered Stage 4 
3301 Not app. No No 
3302 Not app. No Yes 
3303 Not app. No Yes 
3400 Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 2 
3401 No No No 
3402 No Yes Yes 
3403 No No Yes 
3500 Stage 1 Stage 1 Stage 2 
3501 No No Yes 
3502 No No No 
3503 No No No 
 
 
 
 
 
